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1 Introduction
Energy economic research contributes to a better understanding of energy markets,
such as resource and electricity markets. Within this broad field, research on mar-
kets, policy interventions and environmental issues is, among others, conducted.
One unique characteristic of energy markets, serving as ‘common ground’ for aca-
demic studies in the field of energy economics, is the condition of a reliable power
supply that satisfies power consumption over time and even more importantly in
real time. Given that supply and demand levels could change (rapidly) on a tem-
poral scale, based on for instance forced generation unit, transmission line outages,
sudden load changes or regulations, this seemingly unremarkable condition has far-
reaching implications for generators, consumers and policy makers alike. Whereas
both, the demand and supply side can individually contribute to a secure system,
policy makers may be willing to set the right framework for energy markets and
correct market failures or even implement policy instruments for a desired outcome.
In this thesis, the following four essays on energy economics, covering the listed
topics, are presented. Each chapter is based on a single article to which the authors
contributed equally:
Chapter 2: When are Consumers Responding to Electricity Prices? An Hourly Pattern
of Demand Elasticity (based on Knaut & Paulus (2016))
Chapter 3: Competition and Regulation as a Means of Reducing CO2-Emissions -
Experience from U.S. Fossil Fuel Power Plants (based on Growitsch et al. (2017))
Chapter 4: The Impact of Advanced Metering Infrastructure on Residential Electric-
ity Consumption - Evidence from California (based on Paschmann & Paulus (2017))
Chapter 5: Electricity Reduction in the Residential Sector - The Example of the Cal-
ifornian Energy Crisis (based on Paulus (2017))
The four essays are stand-alone and may be read in any order; however, with
the analysis of the demand side in Chapter 2, I intend to shed some light on the
commonly assumed inelastic demand assumption in electricity markets by study-
ing the German market. Chapter 3, 4 and 5 study policy interventions affecting
both, the generation and demand side in electricity markets. Whereas Chapter 3
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addresses policy intervention directed towards environmental protection, Chapter 4
and 5 rather investigate the impact on residential demand reduction through policy
interventions specifically targeting a change in electricity usage.
The presented methodologies to tackle the issues discussed and the topic selection
itself are guided by the author’s interest. The following introduction provides a brief
summary of the four essays, including the research question and a brief discussion
of the results. Furthermore, the author sets out how each of the four essays adds
to existing literature and serve for a better understanding of the investigated top-
ics. The introduction concludes with possible extensions for future research, critical
reflections and some improvements to methodologies for the essays.
1.1 Introducing the Essays
Chapter 2 focuses on the demand elasticity in the German wholesale market by ap-
plying a two stage least-squared estimation technique. Complementary to already
conducted research, the estimated demand elasticity is not sub-market specific. The
estimation is based on hourly time intervals. It is motivated by the thought that
utility resulting from electricity consumption for all end consumers differs in every
hour. Thus, the higher temporal resolution reveals hourly patterns for demand elas-
ticities ranging from -0.02 to -0.13 for the analyzed market area. The article adds
to attempts for measuring demand elasticities of higher temporal order in electricity
market by building on some initial thoughts of Bönte et al. (2015). However, an
analysis for Germany is so far lacking in the literature. Our analysis makes use of
the stochastic character of renewable generation that primarily affects the supply
side but not the demand side thereby serving as a suitable instrument in order to
solve simultaneity issues occurring in electricity markets. The found hourly elasticity
results for the German market may be used for further academic studies attempting
to model electricity markets with simulation methods where commonly demand de-
velopments for sectors are a prior defined as perfectly ‘inelastic’, a restriction that
from the author’s point of view is implicitly questioned.
Chapter 3 investigates the influences of regulation and gas prices on the emission
levels of fossil power plants for all states in the U.S. Research has been motivated by
the rising influence of shale gas in the past decade influencing gas prices and con-
sumption. It furthermore investigates the switch from a heavily coal-based genera-
tion portfolio to a less carbon-intense gas-fired generation portfolio over a thirteen
years period by taking gas price effects and a tightened CO2-regulation for emis-
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sion in the generation portfolio into account. The essay is based on Growitsch et al.
(2017) and uses nonparametric benchmarking techniques to first identify best prac-
tice states between 2000 and 2013. Example states and their generation portfolios
are used to back up results obtained by the approach and provide an intuitive under-
standing for some states, where initial interpretation of benchmarking results may
not be straightforward (i.e. for North Dakota). Secondly, a regression on the CO2
emission performance over time is conducted by controlling among others for gas
prices and all CO2-related regulation, occurring in the form of emission standards
and cap and trade systems. The empirical analysis presented in Chapter 3 adds to
the literature on benchmarking within the power generation field, where good and
bad outputs need to be simultaneously modeled. We make use of the standard as-
sumptions of Färe & Primont (1995) and extend the standard model of Shephard
(1953) by using an input distance function allowing for a multi-input and output
simulation that is indispensable when analyzing emissions of fossil power genera-
tion. Besides best practice states, our results show lower gas prices and stringent
CO2 regulations are suitable means to reduce CO2 emissions.
Chapter 4 analyzes the policy-induced Advanced Metering Infrastructure deploy-
ment in California and the related impact of additional information on residential
electricity consumption. Contrary to the other chapters, Chapter 4 is positioned in
the literature on behavioral economics linking informational feedback, the nature
of consumers being rationally bounded with residential electricity consumption (as
for instance also done by Allcott & Rogers (2014)). A rather systemic perspective is
framing this chapter by analyzing the respective impact of Advanced Metering In-
frastructure deployment on electricity savings. With the help of synthetic control
techniques (Abadie et al., 2010), the obstacle of not having a direct control group
within a large-scale framework is overcome. A Difference-in-Differences estimation
accounts for causality and persistency matters over a 13-year period. As such, the
chosen approach differs with respect to test pilots analyzing shorter time spans and
the fact that a subsample of the population may cause severe estimation bias. The
results show a significant negative impact of Advanced Metering Infrastructure on
monthly residential electricity consumption that ranges from 6.1% to 6.4% over the
respective period. Additionally, an impact of Advanced Metering Infrastructure on
residential electricity consumption only occurs in non-heating periods and does not
fade out over the analyzed time period.
Chapter 5 investigates supply shortages in the Californian electricity market and
the role of policy measures to contain the Energy Crisis. The contribution of this
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paper lies not only in the assessment of policy measures and electricity price effects
to curb residential electricity consumption, it furthermore reveals that consumption
in the Californian residential sector may be reduced by up to 12% triggered partly by
an adjustment within respect to secondary energy use in the residential sector. As my
results show, this ‘reduction potential’ or ‘residential comfort buffer’ is more likely
to be leveraged in summer periods which I relate to comfort issues that consumers
are not willing to ’sacrifice’ on in winter periods. Chapter 5 adds to the discussing
of electricity price impacts in residential electricity markets (Albadi & El-Saadany,
2008) and the effectiveness of short term policy measures targeting residential elec-
tricity reduction rather than technical replacements of household appliances that
commonly cover longer time periods. It is thus positioned in the context of policy
measures not related to changing technical household appliances. Methodologically,
Chapter 5 makes uses of a synthetic control group derivation. A nationwide analysis
for the impact of conservation programs, in particular the ’20/20’ rebate program
and the mass media campaign, emerging from the Californian Energy Crisis has not
been conducted so far. The mutual impact of conservation impacts is estimated via
a treatment regression.
1.2 Future Research and Possible Improvements to
Methodologies
Expect for Chapter 4 and 5 mutually sharing the application of a synthetic con-
trol group derivation, all four chapters address different research questions, each
of which requires a different methodology. Chapter 3 presents a non-parametric
benchmarking approach to model emission improvements over time, followed by an
applied econometric method. Even though the baseline model is extended by the
features of multiple inputs and outputs, reflecting that emissions cannot be reduced
without reducing electricity generation, some researchers tend to rather follow the
material balance constraint programing (i.e. Førsund (2008)) essentially imposing
the condition that residuals cannot be used when jointly modeling input and output
on a multi-dimensional level. The critique applied to previous literature may there-
fore also apply to the analysis presented here. In addition, the model may fail to in-
corporate important features of the industry on a micro level. Firm specific data may
thus grasps the fundamental industry structure of the fossil generation with more
detail. However, it may also be noted that the aggregated data used by the authors
stems from a detailed data survey conducted by the Energy Information Adminis-
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tration agency in the U.S. (i.e. EIA form-860) that builds upon data collection on
the power plant unit level. Although numerous estimation specification have been
tested, both with respect to appropriateness of the chosen instrument and variable
selection, estimation bias through variables possessing certain additional explana-
tory power cannot be ruled out with complete certainty.
Chapter 2 estimates hourly demand elasticity in the German market. With respect
to the applied instrument the authors are confident that chosen wind generation is
well-defined and appropriate for estimating prices in the first stage. Other instru-
ments may be considered for solving the endogeneity issue in order to support or
neglect our findings. Furthermore, extending the analysis over a multi-year period
would provide interesting insights into the degree of hourly demand elasticities over
longer periods. As data on renewable infeed has started to be officially published
in 2014, the authors consider an evaluation of other years as an interesting addi-
tional analysis. Lastly, the regional scope of the analysis lacks an important issue
not completely addressed in this chapter. In particular, the regional connection to
neighboring states where electricity may be bought at lower prices are only indi-
rectly reflected by using realized consumed volumes and electricity prices that have
been subject to trading prior to settlement.
As already stated, Chapter 4 and 5 methodologically share the application of a
synthetic control group derivation. The empirical analysis in Chapter 5 ends with
the year 2002 whereas the empirical analysis of Chapter 4 commences in 2003.
In both chapters, the methodological approach builds on Abadie et al. (2010) and
mimics the residential electricity consumption that would have occurred without
the treatment. The gathered data represent a wide range of socio-economic vari-
ables accounting on a monthly basis for both fluctuations of residential electricity
consumption over time and the respective differences between the states. The as-
sumption of parallel trends prior the policy treatment is valid in both chapters and
both chapters add to literature on policy-induced residential consumption changes.
Whereas Chapter 4 analyzes longer periods, Chapter 5 sheds light on whether or
not short term consumption changes may be realized. Methodologically, Chapter 4
specifically accounts for Advanced Metering Infrastructure penetration in the esti-
mation and Chapter 5 captures residential electricity consumption with a treatment
regression by using time dummies and controlling for all other explanatory vari-
ables. An empirical analysis for the conservation measures in Chapter 5 specifically
accounting for explanatory variables may provide a promising further research av-
enue.
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2 When Are Consumers Responding to Electricity
Prices? An Hourly Pattern of Demand Elasticity
System security in electricity markets relies crucially on the interaction between de-
mand and supply over time. However, research on electricity markets has been
mainly focusing on the supply side arguing that demand is rather inelastic. As-
suming perfectly inelastic demand might lead to delusive statements regarding the
price formation in electricity markets. In this article, we quantify the short-run price
elasticity of electricity demand in the German day-ahead market and show that de-
mand is adjusting to price movements in the short-run. We are able to solve the
simultaneity problem of demand and supply for the German market by incorporat-
ing variable renewable electricity generation for the estimation of electricity prices
in our econometric approach. We find a daily pattern for demand elasticity on the
German day-ahead market where price-induced demand response occurs in early
morning and late afternoon hours. Consequently, price elasticity is lowest at night
times and during the day. Our measured price elasticity peaks at a value of approxi-
mately -0.13 implying that a one percent increase in price reduces demand by 0.13
percent.
2.1 Introduction
Understanding the price elasticity of demand is important since demand adjustments
based on price movements contribute to the functioning of electricity markets. In
electricity markets it is worth stressing that balancing demand and supply occurs on a
high temporal frequency which, not only in Germany, results in debates on whether
or not it is possible to match demand and supply at all times. An inelastic price
elasticity of demand assumption, as often argued for the short-run, would imply
that the burden of balancing electricity consumption and generation at all times
rests with the supply side.
The empirical literature estimating long-run and short-run price elastictiy of de-
mand in electricity markets is extensive. For the short-run, peer-reviewed studies
have estimated the elasticity for different sectors and time intervals. Table 2.1 shows
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that estimates of price elasticity vary from -0.02 to -0.3 depending on the chosen ap-
proach, the country-specific data and the sector. Taylor et al. (2005), for instance,
find that short-run elasticity ranges from -0.05 to -0.26 for the industrial sector in
North Carolina by using annual data. He et al. (2011) confirm this finding whereas
Bardazzi et al. (2015) measure a slightly higher elasticity in terms of magnitude for
the Italian industry sector. For the residential sector, numerous studies have been
performed as well (i.e. Ziramba (2008), Dergiades & Tsoulfidis (2008) and Hosoe &
Akiyama (2009)). However, little attention has been devoted to the price response
of the whole market with respect to wholesale prices. So far, this market has only
been investigated by Genc (2014) and Lijesen (2007). Whereas Genc (2014) ap-
plies a bottom-up Cournot modeling framework, Lijesen (2007) uses a regression
approach in order to quantify the price elasticity during peak hours. Genc and Lije-
sen conclude from their chosen approaches that the hourly price elasticity is rather
small. They furthermore argue that in peak hours demand switching behavior of
consumers barely occurs in practice.
In this article we extend the existing literature on short-run elasticity with respect
to the wholesale price in two ways. First, we use wind generation as an instru-
ment variable to solve the simultaneity problem of demand and supply.1 Second,
we account for the variation in utility from electricity consumption during the day.
Using hourly data on load, temperature, prices and wind generation for the German
day-ahead market in 2015, we quantify the level of price elasticity and its variation
throughout the day.
Our results show that the short-run price elasticity of demand in the German elec-
tricity market is not perfectly inelastic. Even though our obtained short-run price
elasticity of demand is generally low, consumers still react to price movements. Mea-
suring the price elasticity of demand can give a more meaningful understanding of
the contribution of demand reactions to system security. However, we stress that a
price elasticity of demand with respect to the day-ahead price is not explicitly show-
ing the contribution of each consumer group. The daily pattern of our estimate of
price elasticity reveals some prominent peaks in the morning and evening, where
the price elasticity of demand is highest. As expected, these hours show overall high
price levels providing incentives to consumers for a reduction of their consumption.
In the morning and evening hours, price elasticity varies between -0.08 and -0.13.
Thus, we infer that demand adjustments in these hours are to some extent beneficial
for consumers. On the contrary, we measure a lower price elasticity of demand at
1The approach is similar to Bönte et al. (2015).
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Table 2.1: Literature review of estimated short-run elasticity
Source Type of model Type of data Elasticity Sector Region
Garcia-Cerrutti (2000) Dynamic random vari-
ables model
Annual -0.79 to 0.01,
mean -0.17
Residential California
Al-Faris (2002) Dynamic cointegration
and Error Correction
Model
Annual,
1970-1997
-0.04 / -0.18 Oman
Bjørner & Jensen (2002) Log-linear fixed effects Panel, 1983-
1996
-0.44
Boisvert et al. (2004) Generalized Leontief Peak: -0.05 TOU
Holtedahl & Joutz
(2004)
Cointegration and Error
Correction Model
Annual,
1955-1996
-0.15 Residential Taiwan
Reiss & White (2005) Reduced form approach Annual ,
1993 and
1997
0 to -0.4 Residential California
Taylor et al. (2005) Generalized McFadden
with nonlinear OLS and
Seemingly Unrelated
Regression
1994-2001 -0.26 to -0.05 Industry Duke Energy,
North Carolina
Bushnell & Mansur
(2005)
lagged residential prices -0.1 Residential San Diego
Error Correction Model Annual,
1969-2000
-0.263 Residential Australia
Bernstein et al. (2006) dynamic demand model
with lagged variables
and fixed effects
Panel, 1977-
2004
1977-1999
-0.24 to -0.21 Residential,
Commercial
US
Rapanos & Polemis
(2006)
1965-1999 -0.31 Greece
Halicioglu (2007) Bounds testing approach
to cointegration within
ARDL model
1968-2005 -0.33 Turkey
Lijesen (2007) reduced form regression
linear, loglinear
-0.0014 -0.0043 Wholesale Netherlands
Dergiades & Tsoulfidis
(2008)
Bounds testing approach
to cointegration within
ARDL model
1965-2006 -1.06 Residential US
Ziramba (2008) Bounds testing approach
to cointegration within
ARDL model
1978-2005 -0.02 Residential South Africa
Hosoe & Akiyama (2009) OLS/Translog cost func-
tion
1976-2006 0.09 to 0.3 Residential Japan
He et al. (2011) General equilibrium
analysis
2007 -0.017 to -0.019,
-0.293 to -0.311,
-0.0624 to
-0.0634
Industry,
residential,
agriculture
China
Bardazzi et al. (2015) Two-stage translog
model
Panel,
2000-2005
–0.561 to -0.299 Industry Italy
Genc (2014) Cournot competition
model
Hourly
2007, 2008
-0.144 to -0.013
-0.019 to -0.083
Wholesale Ontario
night times and during the day. A lower elasticity indicates less willingness of con-
sumers to adjust the consumption due to high or low electricity prices. This can be
due to the fact that economic activity in general is higher during daytime.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 deepens the un-
derstanding of supply and demand in electricity markets. Section 2.3 describes the
data and presents the applied econometric approach. Section 2.4 discusses the esti-
mation results. Section 2.5 concludes.
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2.2 Measuring Market Demand Reactions Based on
Wholesale Prices
In order to specify our econometric model capturing demand reactions due to elec-
tricity wholesale price movements, knowledge about the supply and demand func-
tions in electricity markets is pivotal. In this section, we therefore describe the func-
tioning of the retail and wholesale electricity market before arguing that demand
elasticity can be estimated based on market demand being defined as aggregated
demand of all end consumer groups and wholesale electricity prices. We further
specify the drivers of demand and supply by setting up the respective functions.
2.2.1 The Retail Market for Electricity
Consumers commonly sign contracts with retailers to take charge of their electric-
ity demand. These contracts are subject to different possible tariff schemes ranging
from time-invariant pricing to real-time pricing. Tariff structures vary depending on
the consumer group and metering facilities.2 Small end consumers (e.g. households,
businesses, or small industries) in Germany are mostly on time-invariant tariffs. This
means that the price of electricity for these consumer groups is at the same level for
every hour over the entire year. These consumers therefore have little incentive to
adjust their demand in the short-run. For larger consumers, such as big industrial
companies, contracts are differently designed allowing them to benefit from adjust-
ing consumption in the short run.3
In Germany, the retail price that consumers pay for electricity consists of several
components. The most important component is the price for electricity generation,
which is the price that generators charge for the generation of electricity. Besides
paying for the generation of electricity, end consumers also pay for the transmission
and distribution of electricity, as well as for additional taxes and levies. In Germany,
for instance the retail price consists of network charges, the renewable support levy,
and taxes which are added to the wholesale price. Some of these additional price
2The electricity consumption of many end consumers is not observable over time because the metering
facilities only display the amount of electricity consumed but not during which period measurement
is performed.
3According to Bundesnetzagentur (2016), consumers can be grouped by their metering profile into
customers with and without interval metering. Only consumers with interval metering have the
technical capability to be billed depending on the time of usage. For Germany in 2014, 268 TWh
were supplied to interval metered customers and 160 TWh to customers without interval metering.
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components vary substantially depending on the consumer group.4 The differing
retail prices for each consumer group lead to a total electricity demand of all con-
sumers that varies over the year. This aggregated demand of all end consumers is
equal to the observed load in the total electricity system.
2.2.2 The Wholesale Market for Electricity
The price for electricity generation is determined in the wholesale market. In prin-
cipal, the wholesale market allows different players to place bids that eventually
either result in produced quantities or demanded quantities for a specific point in
time. Participants in these markets are for example utilities, retailers, power plant
operators and large industrial consumers.
Figure 2.1(i) gives an exemplary overview of the five different players and their
corresponding electricity demand and supply on the wholesale market. The first two
players are two different utilities, A and B. As such, utility A and B illustrate cases
for players with different generation assets while at the same time each of them pos-
sesses different customer bases. However, for both utilities, we would expect that
generation for their own customer base depends on the marginal cost of genera-
tion. In other words, if the wholesale price is above the marginal cost of the utility’s
marginal cost of generation, the utility chooses to supply their customer base instead
of demanding quantities from the wholesale market.
The next player in the market we refer to is the retailer. As a retailer, supplying
electricity is by default not an option and therefore we expect them to demand elec-
tricity quantities only. The opposite is true for renewable and conventional genera-
tion players. With marginal costs of zero, renewable generation players offer their
production at very low cost compared to conventional generation players where
marginal costs are greater than zero and vary depending on the generation technol-
ogy.
Figure 2.1(ii) horizontally aggregates all demand and supply curves from each
player we identified. It thus shows the aggregated demand and supply, as well as
the realized equilibrium electricity price of 20 EUR/MWh.
Figure 2.1(iii) shows the resulting supply and demand bids by the individual play-
ers in the wholesale market. First, players that can only supply electricity, such as
renewable or conventional generators, appear in ascending order on the supply side
4In Germany, for example, electricity intensive industries are exempted from paying the renewable
support levy.
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Figure 2.1: Electricity price formation on the wholesale market
only. Second, retailers demand quantities and generally more, if prices are low.
Third, players that own generation assets and also have customers, net their supply
and demand positions internally before submitting bids. This is the case for utility
A and B. The bids for the demand and supply side depend on the internal netting of
supply and demand. In total this results in four possible outcomes for placing bids
which can be describes as follows
• sell bid on the supply side for generation units that have not been internally
matched and could satisfy the demand of other participants
• purchase bid on the demand side for demand that has not been internally
matched
• sell bid on the supply side, resulting from demand that has been matched
internally but would be able to reduce consumption if the price rises above a
given threshold (see e.g. demand of utility B with 90 EUR/MWh)
• purchase bid on the demand side for generation units that have internally be
matched but that would substitute their production if the price falls below
their marginal costs of generation.
Whereas the first two outcomes are intuitively straightforward, outcomes three
and four may seem counter intuitive at first. Due to the internal matching of sup-
ply and demand, parts of the demand and supply curve that have been internally
12
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matched result in bids on the opposite side. By placing these bids, utilities can
optimize their position and choose to substitute formally demanded quantities to
supplied quantities or vice versa, above or below a certain wholesale price.
The supply and demand curves in Figure 2.1(ii) and 2.1(iii) look very different
from a first glance, but both result in the same price for electricity and lead to the
same allocation of resources. Nevertheless, both provide a very different impres-
sion of the price responsiveness of the demand side. Based on Figure 2.1(ii) the
demand side can be characterized as rather price inelastic. In the example, the level
of demand would not change if prices stay within a range of 5 to 80 EUR/MWh. Fig-
ure 2.1(iii) may however lead to the misleading conclusion that the demand side in
electricity markets is rather price elastic. Within the submitted supply and demand
bids at the wholesale market it is not possible to identify separate bids that actually
stem from generators or actual consumers of electricity. It is therefore not possi-
ble to estimate the demand elasticity of actual electricity consumers based on the
curves observed in the wholesale market. In order to estimate the demand elasticity
of the actual electricity consumers it is, however, possible to combine the wholesale
equilibrium price with the total load observed.
2.2.3 The Interaction of Wholesale and Retail Markets
Within this article we are interested in the reaction of electricity demand to electricity
prices. Because disaggregated load data for each consumer group with the respective
retail prices are not available, we focus our attention on the interaction of total
hourly demand and hourly wholesale electricity prices. Figure 2.2 shows the relation
we are interested in for an exemplary hour. The blue line depicts the supply curve for
electricity generation. The red line is the aggregated demand curve of all consumers
for electricity consumption. Consumers pay an average retail price of pr , which is
made up of the wholesale price for electricity (pw) and additional price components
(c).5 When we account for the effect of the additional price components, we obtain
the demand function that is observable in the wholesale market (wholesale demand,
red dashed line). The intersection of wholesale demand and wholesale supply leads
to point A and determines the wholesale price pw, as well as the quantity consumed
and produced qel . By inferring the relationship illustrated in Figure 2.2 and using
the wholesale price and total electricity demand, we are able to estimate the point
elasticity of the red dashed demand curve.
5In Germany, most additional price components are added to the wholesale price independent on the
price level or quantity consumed.
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Figure 2.2: Supply and demand curves for one exemplary hour
The relations of the demand and supply curve in electricity markets are only
vaguely sketched in Figure 2.2. In reality, demand is fluctuating over time due to
varying utility levels throughout the day. The demand for electricity can be regarded
as a function of various inputs and the relation can be written as
d el = f (pw, HDD, time-of-the-day), (2.1)
where del is the quantity consumed, p
w is the wholesale price for electricity, HDD
are heating degree days capturing the seasonality within the data. HDD measure the
temperature difference to a reference temperature. The variable therefore captures
the seasonal variation of electricity demand. For example, if outside temperature
is low, heating processes consume more electricity compared to warmer weather
conditions.6 In addition, electricity consumption depends on the time of usage. This
is mainly driven by the variation of the consumer’s utility function over the day.
Additional variables determining the level of demand, such as economic activity,
may also alter demand but are assumed to be time-invariant on an hourly basis and
within the considered time span. Therefore, we abstract from including additional
variables for the demand side in the short run.
Like the demand function, the supply of electricity can also be regarded as a func-
tion of multiple inputs with the wholesale price pw being one of them. We define
the supply function as:
6The data in Section 2.4 reveals that this relation is true for Germany, however it may not be applicable
to other countries. In warmer climates also cooling degree days (CDD) determine the demand for
electricity.
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sel = g(pw, p f uel , r), (2.2)
where sel is the quantity produced, p f uel is a vector of fuel prices and r is the
production of variable renewable energy.
In electricity markets, the structure of the supply side is commonly represented by
the merit order curve. It represents the marginal generation costs of all conventional
(fossil) power plants. The shape of the curve mainly depends on the technologies
being used for power generation and their respective fuel prices p f uel .7 However,
variable renewable electricity generation is becoming increasingly important within
the generation portfolio. This is particularly true for the German market region.
Since renewable technologies do not rely on fossil fuel inputs to generate electricity,
their fuel costs are close to zero. Additionally, its stochastic nature that is driven
by wind speeds and solar radiation makes generation vary throughout time. We
will later make use of the stochastic nature and by using wind generation as an
instrument variable within our econometric model.
2.3 Empirical Framework
2.3.1 Data
Our data set consists of hourly data for 2015. We include hourly data for load, day-
ahead-prices and the forecast of production from variable renewables for Germany.
In addition, HDD are calculated based on hourly temperatures that we obtain from
the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS). Summary statistics for all
variables are provided in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics (for weekdays, without public holidays and Christmas time)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Source
Load [GWh] 61.688 9.428 38.926 77.496 ENTSO-E
Wind Generation [GWh] 8.574 6.864 0.153 32.529 EEX Transparency
Day-ahead price [EUR/MWh] 35.6 11.5 -41.74 99.77 EPEX Spot
Temperature [◦C] 10.4 7.9 -6.3 34.6 NASA MERRA
Heating degree days [K] 10.1 6.9 0 26.3 NASA MERRA
The hourly load profile for Germany was taken from ENTSO-E. According to ENTSO-
E, load is the power consumed by the network including network losses but ex-
7Common power plant types and fuels are hydro power, nuclear, lignite, coal, gas and oil.
15
2 When Are Consumers Responding to Electricity Prices? An Hourly Pattern of Demand Elasticity
cluding consumption of pumped storage and generating auxiliaries.8 The load data
includes all energy that is sold by German power plants to consumers.9 Load there-
fore is the best indicator on the level of demand in the German market area since
almost all energy sold has to be transferred through the grid to consumers. Fig-
ure 2.3(i) shows average hourly values for weekdays in the German market area
in a box plot. The plot shows significant differences in the level for night hours
(00:00-6:00, 19:00-00:00) compared to daytime. Also load peaks in the morning
(9:00-12:00) and evening hours (16:00-18:00). Especially in the evening, variation
in load levels is higher than at other times. The average load level is 62 GW and the
maximum peak load is 77 GW in the early evening hours.
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(iv) Solar generation from EEX Transparency
Figure 2.3: Hourly data for load, electricity price, wind and solar generation for 2015
We obtain the hourly day-ahead price for electricity from the European Power
Exchange (EPEX) which is the major trading platform for Germany. Historically the
day-ahead price has evolved as the most important reference price on an hourly level
8ENTSO-E collects the information from the four German transmission system operators (TSO) and
claims that the data covers at least 91% of the total supply. These quantities may also be reflected
in the day-ahead price which we can not account for.
9To a small amount load may also include energy that is sold from neighboring countries to the
German market. These trade flows impact the domestic electricity price and load. However, we
expect this impact to be rather small.
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in the wholesale electricity market. The day-ahead market run by EPEX Spot is by
far the most liquid trading possibility close to the point of physical delivery.10 The
price is determined in a uniform price auction at noon one day before electricity is
physically delivered. We follow this perspective and use the day-ahead price as our
reference price for electricity generation. Although not all electricity is sold through
the day-ahead-auction, the price reflects the value of electricity in the respective
hours and contains all available information on demand and supply at that specific
point in time. Figure 2.3(ii) shows a box plot for the hourly day-ahead electricity
price for each hour of the day. The average hourly day-ahead electricity price is
at 36 EUR/MWh over the 24 hours time interval and for weekdays (without public
holidays and Christmas time). The electricity price pattern is similar to the load
pattern emphasizing the fact that higher demand levels tend to increase prices in
the day-ahead market. Especially during peak times in the morning and evening
one can observe higher standard deviations and peaking prices. Standard deviation
over all hours is around 12 EUR/MWh.
Electricity generation from wind and solar power is taken from forecasts published
on the transparency platform by the European Energy Exchange (EEX). These fore-
casts result from multiple TSO data submissions to the EEX. Since they are submitted
one day before physical delivery, they contain all information that is relevant for par-
ticipants in the day-ahead market.11 Figure 2.3(iii) and 2.3(iv) show box plots for
electricity generation from wind and solar power. Due to weather dependent gen-
eration volatility, we observe a larger amount of volatility in the hourly data. Wind
generation varies steadily throughout the day with a small increase during the day.
Solar generation shows its typical daily pattern with no generation at night and peak
generation values for midday.
The level of demand does not only depend on the electricity price which in return is
partially influenced by generation from wind. We add temperature as an additional
parameter to our investigation of electricity demand since the level of temperature
is a main driver for the seasonal variation of demand. We compute a Germany wide
average temperature based on the reanalysis MERRA data set provided by NASA
(NASA, 2016). The hourly values are based on different grid points within Germany
that are spatially averaged in order to obtain a consistent hourly value for Germany.
Based on the hourly temperature we derive HDD that are relevant for the seasonal
10In 2015 264 TWh have been traded in the day-ahead market, compared to 37 TWh traded in the
continuous intraday market (EPEX Spot, 2016).
11We also considered taking the actual generation from renewables but reckon that the ex-ante fore-
casts are reflecting the causal relationship in a better way since decisions made on the day-ahead
market are based on forecast values.
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variation of demand in electricity markets.12
2.3.2 Econometric Approach
Due to the fact that the electricity price is endogenously determined by the inter-
action of demand and supply, we choose a two-stage approach to solve the simul-
taneity problem.13 As we are interested in estimating the demand function (2.1),
possible instruments affecting the price but not the level of demand have to be de-
termined. Possible instruments can be found on the supply side in (2.2), where fuel
prices (p f uel) and the production of variable renewable energy (r) are considered.
Although fuel prices are one of the major drivers for generation decisions, a closer
look reveals that they show little variation over the year 2015 (see Figure 2.6 in the
Appendix). Therefore, we exclude them from a further analysis within our frame-
work.
The production of variable renewable energy (r) can further be split into wind (w)
and solar (s) generation. Figure 2.4 depicts the respective correlations of renewable
generation with prices and load for each hour interval of the day. In Figure 2.4i, we
observe that the correlation between solar generation and load is higher in absolute
values than the correlation between wind generation and load. However, wind and
solar generation are correlated opposite in sign with load being positively correlated
with wind generation and solar generation negatively correlated with load.
Figure 2.4ii shows the correlation between renewable generation and electricity
price. Both, wind and solar generation are negatively correlated with the electricity
price, however their patterns are different throughout the day. The correlation be-
tween wind generation and electricity price weakens over the day until 17:00 where
the correlation is lowest with an absolute value of -0.45. From 17:00 on the cor-
relation between wind generation and price increases again. The pattern for the
correlation between solar generation and electricity price is reversed whereas the
increasing correlation until 17:00 is mainly driven by an increasing solar radiation.
Based on the generally high correlation of wind and prices and at the same time low
correlation of wind and load, we choose wind generation as an instrument for the
price.14
12We calculate HDDs based on a reference temperature of 20 ◦C.
13Durbin and Wu–Hausman test statistics show highly significant p-values. The null hypothesis tests
for all variables in scope being exogenous. With p-values for both test of both equal to 0,000 we
reject the null of exogeneity implying that prices and demand are endogenous.
14Statistically speaking, weak instruments may cause estimation bias if the correlation with the en-
dogenous explanatory variable (in our case pwh,t) is very low.
18
2.3 Empirical Framework
0 5 10 15 20
Hour of the day
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
C
or
re
la
tio
n
Wind
Solar
(i) Correlations with load
0 5 10 15 20
Hour of the day
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
C
or
re
la
tio
n
Wind
Solar
(ii) Correlations with price
Figure 2.4: Correlations with load and prices in 2015
More formally, wind generation as a variable fulfills the two conditions
(1) cov[w, pw] 6= 0 and (2) cov[w,µ] = 0, where w is wind generation, pw the
wholesale electricity price and µ the error term of the general demand equation
not to be confused with the error term µh,t of equation (2.4). The first condition is
needed in order to provide unbiased electricity price estimates. In our context the
chosen instrument w correlates with the electricity price (see Figure 2.4(ii)). From
the second condition it follows that w and µ are not correlated.15 Because wind can
be regarded as a stochastic variable especially throughout the day and load inhibits
strong daily patterns, both can be regarded as independent (see Figure 2.4(i)). With
these two conditions fulfilled we are now able to postulate the first and second stage
equations. The first stage can be written as
pwh,t = γ0,h + γ1,h ·wh,t + εh,t (2.3)
and the second stage as
qelh,t = β0,h + β1,h ·dpwh,t + β2 ·HDDt + β3 ·MONt + β4 · FRIt +µh,t . (2.4)
We estimate price coefficients β1,h and dummy coefficients β0,h on an hourly basis
h. We do this, because we expect the utility of electricity consumption to be different
in each hour of the day. Here, β0,h captures the price independent change of util-
ity from electricity consumption throughout the day. Since we observe a different
15Testing for validity expressed by cov[w,µ] = 0 within our framework is not feasible since our model
is exactly identified.
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demand pattern for working days and week-ends, we eliminate week-ends and hol-
idays from the data. Furthermore, we add dummies for Monday (MON) and Friday
(FRI)16 to capture differing demand levels at the beginning and end of the working
week. Based on our estimates, we can calculate the average hourly price elasticity
of electricity demand according to
εh =
pwh
qh
∂ qh
∂ ph
=
pwh
qh
β1,h, (2.5)
where εh is the hourly elasticity using the average price p
w
h and average demand
qh in the respective hour of the day (h).
2.4 Empirical Application
By applying the econometric framework, we are able to estimate the level of price
elasticity of demand for the German day-ahead market on an hourly basis. The
regression is based on levels and elasticity is calculated with respect to the average
prices and quantities in each hour.17
The results of the estimation can be found in Table 2.3. When taking a look at the
price coefficients in Table 2.3(a), we can see that all price coefficients are negative
in sign and are significant at least at the 1% level. We note that coefficients during
morning hours (9:00-12:00) are lower in absolute values. The highest value can be
found at 17:00. In this particular hour, a wholesale price increase of 1 EUR/MWh
leads to a demand reduction of 201.8 MWh. The hourly dummy coefficients in Ta-
ble 2.3(a) capture the varying level of utility throughout the day. During the day,
hourly coefficients are higher than at other times. In the evening, we can observe
a peak in the level of utility, especially between 16:00 - 20:00 (see Figure 2.5(i)).
Beside the hourly coefficients, we also account for the influence of temperature and
weekdays on electricity demand. All coefficients are significant at the 0.1% level and
can be explained in their sign. HDD have a positive sign and thus increase electric-
ity demand. Mondays and Fridays are negative in sign, indicating that demand is
generally lower at the start of the week and at the end compared to other working
16For Mondays the dummy is positive for the time between 0:00 and 9:00. For Fridays the time frame
is from 17:00 to 23:00.
17In a previous version of the paper, we normalized our data to the median, which is why previous
estimates differ from this version. Furthermore, elasticity was calculated with respect to the average
price and quantity level including values of zero. As we are running a pooled regression many
observations of zero were included which resulted in low estimates of the elasticity.
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Figure 2.5: Hourly dummies and price elasticity of electricity demand in 2015
Since the focus of our work is on the hourly price elasticity of demand, we estimate
the elasticity based on the results from the basic regression. The results are displayed
in Figure 2.5(ii) and the numerical values can be found in Table 2.3(c).18
As observed before, all coefficients are negative in sign and significant at a strict
1% level. With the elasticity estimates at hand, we are able to plot a distinctive
pattern for the hourly price elasticity of demand for the German day-ahead market.
The unique shape of the hourly price elasticity of demand pattern is depicted above
in Figure 2.5(ii). Our results show that demand reactions are rather small. How-
ever, a perfect inelastic demand assumption can also be neglected. More precisely,
the elasticity is the lowest during night times (22:00 - 6:00). During these hours
electricity demand and utility from electricity consumption is generally lower (as
we can also observe from Table 2.3(a)). The graph shows two prominent peaks of
price elasticity of demand in the morning and in the evening. At these times working
hours start and end. Possible reasons for a high elasticity of demand at those times
is the shifting or delaying of consumption. When prices are low in the morning,
some processes may be able to start the operation earlier and thereby circumventing
a time with a higher electricity price level. The same might be true for the evening,
when the workday ends. Here working hours may be extended to lower price levels
at other times. Throughout the day, the price elasticity of demand remains relatively
18It is important to note that elasticity is calculated with respect to the wholesale price level and not
the retail price level, as represented by the dashed red demand curve in Figure 2.2. The elasticity
with respect to retail prices would be higher. For example if we consider the sum of additional
price components (c) to be 150 EUR/MWh, which is an average value based on Eurostat (2016)
for Germany, the highest elasticity measured would be -0.58 at hour 17:00-18:00. Without the sum
of additional price components, we obtain an elasticity of -0.13 as indicated in Table 2.3(c).
21
2 When Are Consumers Responding to Electricity Prices? An Hourly Pattern of Demand Elasticity
Table 2.3: Regression results
Hour Price Dummy
0 -0.0847∗∗∗ (-3.98) .
1 -0.0853∗∗∗ (-4.18) -2.135∗∗ (-2.91)
2 -0.0781∗∗∗ (-4.23) -3.429∗∗∗ (-4.94)
3 -0.0960∗∗∗ (-4.89) -2.816∗∗∗ (-4.01)
4 -0.1150∗∗∗ (-5.60) -0.8526 (-1.18)
5 -0.1298∗∗∗ (-6.01) 3.714∗∗∗ (4.70)
6 -0.1322∗∗∗ (-4.96) 13.410∗∗∗ (11.95)
7 -0.1192∗∗∗ (-4.37) 20.620∗∗∗ (15.14)
8 -0.0743∗∗∗ (-3.55) 21.960∗∗∗ (19.48)
9 -0.0452∗∗ (-2.95) 20.940∗∗∗ (24.20)
10 -0.0421∗∗ (-2.69) 22.230∗∗∗ (26.42)
11 -0.0496∗∗ (-2.92) 23.720∗∗∗ (27.34)
12 -0.0557∗∗ (-3.01) 23.080∗∗∗ (26.61)
13 -0.0688∗∗∗ (-3.30) 22.590∗∗∗ (24.57)
14 -0.0844∗∗∗ (-3.58) 21.660∗∗∗ (22.02)
15 -0.1069∗∗∗ (-4.02) 21.240∗∗∗ (19.26)
16 -0.1486∗∗∗ (-3.66) 21.630∗∗∗ (13.19)
17 -0.2018∗∗ (-2.90) 24.990∗∗∗ (8.15)
18 -0.1349∗∗ (-2.65) 22.970∗∗∗ (9.41)
19 -0.1175∗∗ (-3.19) 21.410∗∗∗ (11.81)
20 -0.1327∗∗∗ (-5.14) 18.490∗∗∗ (15.26)
21 -0.1034∗∗∗ (-5.68) 13.760∗∗∗ (15.81)
22 -0.0890∗∗∗ (-4.66) 9.565 (11.29)
23 -0.0836∗∗∗ (-4.05) 4.164 (5.25)
(a) Dummy and price coefficients
Coefficient
Heating degree days 0.4679∗∗∗ (81.99)
Monday dummy -3.340∗∗∗ (-28.08)
Friday dummy -1.997∗∗∗ (-12.07)
Constant 46.57∗∗∗ (84.62)
Observations 5760
R2 0.940
Adjusted R2 0.939
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
(b) Regression coefficients
Hour Elasticity
0 -0.0456∗∗∗ (-3.96)
1 -0.0451∗∗∗ (-4.15)
2 -0.0394∗∗∗ (-4.20)
3 -0.0467∗∗∗ (-4.85)
4 -0.0561∗∗∗ (-5.57)
5 -0.0661∗∗∗ (-5.99)
6 -0.0792∗∗∗ (-4.95)
7 -0.0810∗∗∗ (-4.36)
8 -0.0501∗∗∗ (-3.54)
9 -0.0279∗∗ (-2.95)
10 -0.0240∗∗ (-2.68)
11 -0.0271∗∗ (-2.91)
12 -0.0283∗∗ (-3.00)
13 -0.0345∗∗∗ (-3.29)
14 -0.0425∗∗∗ (-3.57)
15 -0.0566∗∗∗ (-4.01)
16 -0.0828∗∗∗ (-3.64)
17 -0.1275∗∗ (-2.88)
18 -0.0912∗∗ (-2.64)
19 -0.0821∗∗ (-3.18)
20 -0.0875∗∗∗ (-5.12)
21 -0.0640∗∗∗ (-5.65)
22 -0.0543∗∗∗ (-4.63)
23 -0.0456∗∗∗ (-4.03)
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
(c) Elasticity
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low and is less significant. At those hours, economic activity is high and the option to
shift or delay electricity consumption might not be feasible for consumers. In other
words, consumers are bound to consume electricity which results in high electricity
consumption regardless of the price level.
2.5 Conclusion
We estimate the hourly pattern of price elasticity of demand for the German day-
ahead market, using hourly data on load, price, generation of wind and temperature.
By doing this, we are able to determine the degree of short-run demand response
within this market. To the best of our knowledge, a market-wide hourly analysis of
the price elasticity of demand has not been conducted so far.
Based on our two-stage regression approach which uses wind generation as an in-
strument to proxy the electricity price, we find that hourly price elasticity of demand
is not completely price inelastic. Especially during the morning and evening demand
is responding to price signals. Values for price elasticity range from approximately
-0.02 to -0.13 depending on the investigated hour. The hourly price elasticity pattern
reveals that elasticity is lowest in the night hours and around mid day. Low values
for price elasticity during night time (22:00 - 06:00) indicate that consumers are less
likely to react. Around middle day economic activity is high which may explain the
low elasticity values. Price elasticity of demand is the highest in the early morning
(04:00 - 07:00) and late afternoon (16:00 - 20:00) hours, with levels between -0.08
and -0.13.
The empirical results indicate a high level of variation in the price elasticity of
demand throughout the day in the German day-ahead market. Although the hourly
elasticity is low from a first glance, load shifting accumulates over the year. The
found elasticity pattern helps to understand when demand shifting occurs and when
demand may be able to contribute to system security in situations of low supply. We
find that especially during critical situations, such as peak times in the morning and
evening, price elasticity of demand is high and may contribute to a secure electricity
system.
Our research sheds some light on how flexible the German electricity market has
already been in 2015, given the underlying renewable generation of the German
day-ahead market. It may also give policy makers a starting point for evaluating the
interaction of supply and demand in electricity markets. In addition to the analy-
23
2 When Are Consumers Responding to Electricity Prices? An Hourly Pattern of Demand Elasticity
sis of the day-ahead market, we reckon that further research on demand response
could focus on short-term markets, such as the intraday market. These markets are
essential to the integration of large amounts of renewable electricity because they
are able to balance forecast errors of wind and solar electricity. Whereas this addi-
tional research would gain further insights onto the short-term demand response,
we argue that currently the day-ahead market remains the most important market
where demand and supply are balanced.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Price Development of Potential Other Instrument Variables
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Figure 2.6: Prices for coal, gas and co2 certificates from January to December 2015
25

3 Competition and Regulation as a Means of
Reducing CO2-Emissions - Experience from
U.S. Fossil Fuel Power Plants
Levels of CO2 emissions from electricity generation in the U.S. have changed consid-
erably in the last decade. This development can be attributed to two factors. First,
the shale gas revolution has reduced gas prices significantly, leading to a crowding
out of the more CO2-intensive coal for electricity generation. Secondly, environmen-
tal regulations have been tightened at both the federal and the state level. In this
article, we analyze the relative CO2 emission performance across 48 states in the U.S.
using a two-stage empirical approach. In the first stage, we identify the states that
followed best practice between 2000 and 2013, by applying nonparametric bench-
marking techniques. In the second stage, we regress our CO2 emission performance
indicators on the state-specific national gas prices, the states’ CO2 regulatory poli-
cies and a number of other state-specific factors in order to identify the main drivers
of the developments. We find that the CO2 emission performance improved on av-
erage by 15% across all states from 2000 to 2013. Furthermore, our second-stage
results support the argument that decreasing natural gas prices and stringent reg-
ulatory measures, such as cap-and-trade programs, have a positive impact on the
state-specific CO2 emission performance.
3.1 Introduction
During the last decade, the electricity sector in the U.S. has undergone considerable
change. On the supply side, the plummeting of gas prices induced by the so-called
shale gas revolution has created incentives for power producers to increase gas usage
and even to switch investment decisions in new capacity from coal to gas. As natural
gas emits less than 50% of the CO2 per kwh that coal does, emissions might have
dropped as a result of fuel competition. Policy-wise, greenhouse gas emissions from
the generating fleet have become a nationwide concern: in 2013, U.S. electricity
generation accounted for more than 2,000 million tons of carbon dioxide (CO2)
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emissions, or about 38% of the total U.S. energy-related emissions. About 70%
of the electricity generated in 2013 was produced from fossil fuels (U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA), 2016b).
Recently, the U.S. government has announced that it will pursue CO2 reduction
strategies to cut CO2 emissions by 26-28% by 2025 compared to 2005 levels.
19 One
important measure for achieving this aim is the so-called Clean Power Plan. As part
of this, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has suggested regulations
to require existing power plants to reduce power sector emissions by 32% from their
2005 levels by 2030 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 2015). Prior to
these new guidelines, the rules were also tightened to permit fewer carbon emissions
from electricity generation. States have introduced different means of regulation,
from CO2 performance standards (e.g. in Washington) to regional cap-and-trade
programs (e.g. the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)). Both trends, inter-
fuel competition and regulation, seem to have significantly decreased electricity-
related CO2 emissions. From their peak in 2007, CO2 emissions from electricity
generation dropped by about 16% between 2007 and 2013 (U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA), 2016b). Whether the main reason for CO2 reduction was
competition or regulation remains an empirical question.
In this article, we analyze the success of the U.S. states in reducing CO2 emis-
sions from fossil fuel power plants. We identify CO2 emission performance at the
state level over time, and drivers that may have contributed to changing CO2 devel-
opments. Faced with these developments, we argue that an overall fuel switching
from high emitters like coal-fired power plants to cleaner technologies like natural
gas combustion has occurred. To examine whether or not state-specific fuel price
developments and/or CO2 regulations also drove down emissions, we follow a two-
step approach. First, we employ nonparametric data envelopment analysis tech-
niques that allow us to measure the relative CO2 emission performance across states
considering the multiple-input and multiple-output production structure of electric-
ity generation. As inputs, we use fuel consumption and nameplate capacity, and,
as outputs, the electricity produced and CO2 emissions. In doing so, we are able
to provide a more comprehensive picture of each state’s fossil fuel electricity gen-
eration process and its relative CO2 emission performance, compared to a simple
output-oriented CO2 intensity measure, such as CO2 emissions per unit of electric-
ity produced. Comprehensive reviews of data envelopment analysis applications in
19Press statement released by the Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, accessible at
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/31/fact-sheet-us-reports-its-2025-emissions-
target-unfccc.
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energy and environmental studies can be found in Zhou et al. (2008) and Zhang &
Choi (2014). Furthermore, a number of studies have addressed the measurement
of the environmental efficiency of U.S. power plants (e.g., Färe et al., 2013, Hampf
& Rødseth, 2015, Sueyoshi & Goto, 2013, Sueyoshi et al., 2010, Welch & Barnum,
2009).
In a second stage, we regress the performance indicators we have obtained on the
state-specific natural gas prices, the states’ CO2 regulatory policies and a number
of other state-specific factors in order to identify the main drivers of the develop-
ment. This approach allows us not only to answer the question of whether fuel price
competition and/or emissions regulation have proven to be successful in compre-
hensively reducing greenhouse gases but also to evaluate the impact of regulatory
reforms at the state level.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a short
overview of U.S. electricity generation from fossil fuels, and its trends. Section 3.3
describes the empirical approach. Section 3.4 presents and discusses the results and
Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 U.S. electricity generation from fossil fuels 2000 - 2013
U.S. electricity generation has undergone substantial changes since the early 2000s.
Electricity generation from fossil fuels does not rely today on the same power gen-
eration technology mix that used to prevail within the U.S. fossil fuel market. The
reasons for this can be found on the regulatory as well as on the market side. On the
market side, one of the most prominent drivers has been the development of U.S.
shale gas production. In less than a decade, the production of shale gas in the U.S.
has managed to make U.S. gas imports irrelevant and has made the national gas
industry self-sufficient (Wang et al., 2014). As a consequence, the price structure of
fossil fuel inputs for electricity generation has changed significantly.
Figure 3.1 shows the cost of fossil fuel receipts at electricity generating plants in
dollars per million British thermal units (MMBtu) (U.S. Energy Information Admin-
istration (EIA), 2016a).20 We observe that, until 2008, fuel prices increased for all
fuel types shown. Interestingly, coal and petroleum prices started to increase again
after 2009, while the natural gas price declined. We partly link this gas price devel-
20The annual cost for fossil fuel receipts is calculated from the averages of monthly values, weighted
by quantities, in Btu across all U.S. states.
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opment to the additional shale gas production volumes that submerged the supply
side of the gas market. This development not only affected the U.S. natural gas prices
but, as a consequence, also boosted the role of natural gas-fired plants in electricity
generation (Krupnick et al., 2013).
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Figure 3.1: Cost of fossil fuel receipts at electricity generating plants in USD per million Btu
In this context, Figure 3.2 shows the shares of net electricity generation from fossil
fuels including coal, natural gas, petroleum and other gases over the same time
horizon (U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2015a). Here, we observe
that the share of net electricity generation from coal was 73% in 2000 and more
than three times higher than the share (22%) of net generation from natural gas
in that year. However, net generation from natural gas steadily increased over time
while net generation from coal significantly decreased supporting our argument that
decreasing gas prices made gas-fired generation more attractive. In 2013, 58% of
total U.S. net electricity generated from fossil fuels was generated from coal, and
41% from natural gas.
Taken together, these observations may lead to the conclusion that low gas prices
have triggered alterations in the use of fuels and the investment in coal or gas-fired
plants. However, such a conclusion is strongly dependent on the time horizon of
the study: as power plant capacity is assumed to be quasi-fixed in the short run, an
instantaneous fuel switch from coal to natural gas that alters the technology mix can
only be achieved if capacity is idle and favorable fuel prices trigger a quick response
of gas-fired generation. Contrary to this short-run response, the portfolio of power
generation technologies is subject to change in the long run. The addition of capacity
depends on the current and expected technology-specific investment cost and fuel
prices.
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Figure 3.2: Shares of total U.S. net electricity generation from fossil fuels in %
Besides the influence of shale gas on the market side, past and future regula-
tions also affect the portfolio of power generation technologies. As an example,
stricter regulation of CO2 provides incentives for an increased usage of gas-fired
power plants. Since generating electricity from natural gas produces nearly half
as much CO2 per kilowatt-hour as coal, such a stricter regulation of CO2 may de-
crease emissions. However, to date there have been no nation-wide standards that
require power plants to reduce their CO2 emissions. State-specific regulatory poli-
cies include overall greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction targets and, CO2 performance
standards related to power plants, as well as regional CO2-cap-and-trade systems
related to power plants. Some states adopted one or all of these measures in the
early years of this century, while others have not yet adopted any measures.21
Hence, given the developments in fuel prices and the various state-specific CO2
regulations, the CO2 emission performance in a state may be influenced by a fuel
switch from coal to gas in the short run. Such a switch is, however, constrained
by the availability of capacity. In the long run, however, a state can influence its
CO2 emission performance by re-designing regulations and making certain power
generation technologies more favorable than others. In this way, a state’s portfolio
of power generation technologies is, for instance, altered by building new gas-fired
power plants and retiring old coal-fired power plants, and thus the capacity share
of gas-fired power plants increases, and more natural gas can be used for electricity
production.
21A detailed overview on state-specific CO2 regulations is given in Section 3.3.3.
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3.3 Empirical approach
3.3.1 Benchmarking model
In order to analyze the state-specific CO2 emission performance of U.S. fossil fuel
power plants we model a production technology that includes both desirable and
undesirable outputs. If we assume that x = (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ ℜN+ denotes a vector of
inputs, y = (y1, . . . , yM ) ∈ ℜM+ denotes a vector of desirable or good outputs, and
b = (b1, . . . , bI) ∈ ℜI+ denotes a vector of undesirable or bad outputs, the production
technology set can be modeled as:
P(x) = {(y, b) : x can produce (y, b)}, (3.1)
where P(x) represents all the combinations of desirable and undesirable outputs
(y, b) that can be produced using the input vector x . P(x) is a convex and compact
set and satisfies the standard properties of "no free lunch", the possibility of inaction,
and strong or free disposability of inputs and good outputs (e.g. Färe & Primont,
1995).
Furthermore, in order to account for the joint production of desirable and undesir-
able outputs we follow Zhou et al. (2010) and impose two additional assumptions.
First, we assume the desirable and the undesirable outputs to be together weakly
disposable:
if (y, b) ∈ P(x) and 0≤ λ≤ 1, then (λy,λb) ∈ P(x). (3.2)
This assumption reflects the opportunity cost of abatement activities. In other
words, a reduction of undesirable outputs is not costless, and negatively influences
the production level of the desirable outputs.22
Second, the desirable and the undesirable outputs are considered as being null-
joint:
if (y, b) ∈ P(x) and b = 0, then y = 0. (3.3)
This means that no desirable outputs can be produced without producing some un-
desirable outputs.23
A production technology that seeks the maximal decrease of undesirable outputs
22The concept of weak disposability was introduced by Shephard (1970).
23The null-jointness assumption was introduced by Shephard & Färe (1974).
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and satisfies the above assumptions can be represented by an input distance function.
Introduced by Shephard (1953), such a function can be formally defined as:
D(x , y, b) = sup {θ : (y, b/θ ) ∈ P(x)} ≥ 1, (3.4)
where θ represents the proportion by which the undesirable output b is scaled to
reach the boundary or frontier of the production technology set P(x). The distance
function value θ is bounded below by one. A value of one identifies the observed
output vector as located on the frontier, whereas values greater than one belong to
output vectors below the frontier. When CO2 emissions are the only undesirable out-
put, Zhou et al. (2010) label this function as the Shephard carbon distance function.
Furthermore, the inverse of the function is closely related to Farrell’s 1957 measure
of input-oriented technical efficiency (TE), that is:
T E(x , y, b) = [D(x , y, b)]−1 ≤ 1. (3.5)
This measure is a pure technical measure of efficiency, focusing on how much good
and bad output is produced from a given quantity of inputs. In our case, efficiency
among the states can differ, in the sense that the same amount of fossil fuel and
the same amount of capacity can produce the same amount of electricity but fewer
CO2 emissions. This can be the result of using a better input quality, that is, by a
higher share of the state’s electricity output being produced from natural gas-fired
power plants that are less carbon-intensive. This share, in turn, is influenced by the
capacity share of natural gas-fired power plants in the state’s electricity generating
portfolio, and its utilization rate.
In order to measure efficiency changes over time, we combine the concepts of the
Malmquist CO2 emission performance index (MCPI) of Zhou et al. (2010) and the
global Malmquist productivity index (GPI) of Pastor & Lovell (2005). The derived in-
dex represents the state-specific CO2 emission performance over time and is termed
the global Malmquist CO2 emission performance index (GMCPI).
Compared to a conventional contemporaneous Malmquist productivity index that
constructs the reference technology in period t from the observations in that period
only, the GMCPI incorporates information from all observations in all periods. By
doing this, the GMCPI provides a single measure of productivity change, is circular,
and does not suffer from any infeasibility problems, thus avoiding the three well-
known problems of conventional contemporaneous Malmquist productivity indices
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(Pastor & Lovell, 2005).
First, in order to define the GMCPI, we consider two benchmark technologies: a
contemporaneous benchmark technology and a global benchmark technology. Fol-
lowing Pastor & Lovell (2005), the contemporaneous benchmark technology is de-
fined as:
P t(x) = {(y t , bt) : x t can produce (y t , bt)}, with t = 1 . . . , T, (3.6)
and the global benchmark technology as:
PGT (x) = conv{P1(x)∪ . . .∪ PT (x)}. (3.7)
The two technologies are graphically illustrated in Figure 3.3. The vertical axis
shows the desirable output y and the horizontal axis shows the undesirable output
b, i.e., CO2 emissions. P
t and P t+1 represent the areas of all feasible combinations
of the desirable and the undesirable output that can be produced by the input vector
x in periods t and t+1, respectively. These technologies are enveloped by the global
technology PGT that represents the area of all feasible input-output combinations in
all periods.
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Figure 3.3: Global Malmquist CO2 emission performance index (GMCPI)
Given Equation 3.4, and with DG(t) = DG(x t , y t , bt) and DG(t+1) = DG(x t+1, y t+1, bt+1),
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the GMCPI between period t and period t + 1 can now be defined as:24
GMC PI =
DG(t)
DG(t + 1)
, (3.8)
A value equal to one indicates no change in the CO2 performance between period
t and period t + 1. If the value is less than one, the CO2 performance decreased,
while a value greater than one represents an increase.
Furthermore, the GMCPI can be decomposed into two components: efficiency
change EC and best practice change BPC . That is,
GMC PI = EC × BPC , (3.9)
where
EC =
D(t)
D(t + 1)
, (3.10)
and
BPC =
DG(t)/Dt(t)
DG(t + 1)/Dt+1(t + 1)
. (3.11)
EC captures the change in the distance of an observation to its respective frontier
in periods t and t + 1. Considering points a1 and a2 in Figure 3.3 as the produc-
tion points of a decision making unit (DMU) in periods t and t + 1, EC is equal to
(ha1/hb1)/(ka2/kc2). EC > 1 indicates a decrease in the distance and hence effi-
ciency progress, whereas EC < 1 represents an increase in the distance and hence
efficiency regress. Similarly, a shift of the contemporaneous frontier away from or
towards the global frontier between period t and period t+1 is captured by BPC . In
Figure 3.3 BPC is calculated as BPC = ((ha1/hd1)/(ha1/hb1))/((ka2/kd2)/(ka2/kc2)).
BPC > 1 indicates technical progress, while BPC < 1 shows technical regress.
In order to determine the required global and contemporaneous distance func-
tions, we employ data envelopment analysis techniques. With s = t, t + 1 and
k = 1, . . . , K observations, the contemporaneous distance function for each observa-
tion k′ in each period s can be obtained by solving the following linear program:
24For notational convenience, we abbreviate the distance functions DG(x t , y t , bt),
DG(x t+1, y t+1, bt+1), Dt(x t , y t , bt) and Dt(x t+1, y t+1, bt+1), respectively, to DG(t), DG(t + 1),
D(t) and D(t + 1) in the following equations.
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[Ds (x s, y s, bs)]−1 = min
z
1
θ
s.t.
K∑
k=1
zsk y
s
km ≥ y sk′m, m = 1, . . . , M , (i)
K∑
k=1
zsk x
s
kn ≤ x sk′n, n = 1, . . . , N , (ii)
K∑
k=1
zsk b
s
ki = θ b
s
k′ i , i = 1, . . . , I , (iii)
zsk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , K , (iv)
(3.12)
where zsk are intensity variables assigning a weight to each observation k when con-
structing the best-practice frontier. The inequality constraints in (i) and (ii) guaran-
tee that observation k′ does not produce more desirable outputs or use fewer inputs
than the efficient benchmark on the frontier. The equality constraints in (iii) im-
pose weak disposability, and the non-negativity constraints in (iv) indicate that the
reference technology exhibits constant returns to scale.
Note that, with only one undesirable output, the optimal solutions to the linear
program under the assumption of weak disposability and the linear program under
the assumption of strong disposability are identical. In other words, with I = 1 the
equality constraint in (iii) can be replaced by the inequality constraint
∑K
k=1 z
s
k b
s
ki ≤
θ bsk′ i (Oggioni et al., 2011).
Finally, with t = 1, . . . , T , the global distance function for each observation k′ in
each period s can be obtained by solving the following linear program:
DG (x s, y s, bs)
−1
= min
z
1
θ
s.t.
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
z tk y
t
km ≥ y sk′m, m = 1, . . . , M , (i)
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
z tk x
t
kn ≤ x sk′n, n = 1, . . . , N , (ii)
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
z tk b
t
ki = θ b
s
k′ i , i = 1, . . . , I , (iii)
z tk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , K , (iv)
(3.13)
As before, in the case of a single undesirable output, the equality constraint in (iii)
can be replaced by the respective inequality constraint.
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3.3.2 Benchmarking data
We conduct our analysis using state-level panel data for 48 out of the 50 federal
states in the U.S. for a 13-year period starting in 2000 and ending in 2013.25 The
data come from the survey forms EIA-860 and EIA-923 of the U.S. Energy Informa-
tion Administration (EIA), which provide detailed information on the inputs and out-
puts of U.S. power plants (U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2015a,b).
As inputs we include aggregated fuel consumption measured in billion British
thermal units (Bn Btu)26 and aggregated nameplate capacity measured in gigawatts
(GW) for all coal- and natural gas-fired power plants in each state.27 Fuel consump-
tion directly influences power plant usage and therefore the desirable and undesir-
able output (net generation and CO2 emissions, respectively). Nameplate capacity
serves as a proxy for the capital input. In the short run, too much capacity is ineffi-
cient, since idle capacity will not be used for generation. However, in the medium
and long run a higher capacity offers more flexibility for switching fuels. Hence, the
capacity variable in our model reflects the trade-off between optimal capacity in the
short run and optimal flexibility in the medium and long run. Besides this inter-
pretation focusing on the electricity generation side of gas and coal, one may relate
inefficiencies to the fact that demand profiles trigger distances to the respective effi-
cient frontier of each state. This may for instance be the case when two states with
different demand profiles possess the same fossil fuel capacity mix, the same gas
price and additionally face identical CO2 regulatory constraints. Depending on the
respective demand structure, both with respect to season and day, gas-fired plants
may only be used as back-up capacity in one state, whereas in the other state gas-
fired generation covers demand at a certain level throughout the day. In both states
this would result in different generation and therewith emission output although the
production technology is identical in both states.
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics based on state-level data for the two input
variables, fuel consumption and generation capacity, and the two output variables,
CO2 emissions measured in million tons and net generation measured in gigawatt-
25Vermont is excluded because it has zero electricity production from coal or gas over this time period,
and so is Hawaii because of its geographic isolation from the mainland.
26We account for the state-specific heat values of coal by using the EIA’s State Energy Data System
(SEDS). The coal consumed by the electrical power sector in each state is calculated by dividing
the total heat content of coal received at the electrical power plants by the total quantity consumed
in physical units, which is collected on Form EIA-923 for each year.
27As the amount of electricity generated from petroleum is very small in the U.S. (see Figure 3.2) we
do not include petroleum-fired power plants in our analysis.
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hours (GWh), for the 48 U.S. states from 2000 to 2013.28 Emissions and net gener-
ation from coal and gas are used as outputs in order to reflect the link and trade-offs
between production and pollution.
The descriptive statistics shown in Table 3.1 reflect a wide range of values, since
power generation sizes and technologies differ across the states. Therefore, the table
primarily shows the size of the U.S. fossil fuel power generation sector. The depicted
minimum and maximum values can be directly linked to certain U.S. states.
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics: state-level data 2000 to 2013
Unit Mean SD Min
value
Max
value
Net generation from coal and gas GWh 57,254.3 56,237.2 1,194.2 358,396.7
CO2 emissions million t 48.6 44.5 0.8 266.4
Fuel consumption Bn Btu 546,921.7 512,824.3 8,392.0 3,159,475.0
Nameplate capacity GW 15.9 16.1 0.7 101.5
Over the whole period, Texas is by far the largest CO2 emitter across all U.S. states
in the electrical power sector. With a peak value of 266 million tons of emitted CO2
in 2011, "Texan" CO2 emissions are more than twice the CO2 emissions of Ohio,
which rank in second place. At the same time, Texas also ranks highest in terms of
overall electricity generated and fuel consumed. Peak annual electricity generation
was equal to 358,397 GWhs and peak annual fossil fuel amounted to 3,159,475
billion Btu, both values occurring in the year 2011. In 2011 Texas had an installed
gas and coal-fired capacity of 101.5 GW. The minimum values shown in Table 3.1 all
belong to Idaho in 2000 and 2011.
3.3.3 Second-stage regression
In order to test which factors determine the differences in the CO2 emission perfor-
mances of the states over time, we regress their cumulative GMCPI obtained in the
first step of our analysis on several state-specific factors, in a second step. The cu-
mulative GMCPI until period t, rather than the GMCPI for each two-year period, is
used in order to account for all CO2 emission performance changes until that period.
As such the cumulative GMCPI is an aggregated measure capturing GMCPI changes
over time intervals up to a certain point in time (i.e. year) and is thus different from
28Because of some suspicious changes in one or more of the in- and outputs from one year to the other
(changes higher than 100%) we exclude the observations for Idaho and New Hampshire in the
years 2000 to 2002, as well as the observation for Maine in the year 2000, from our data set.
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a two-year comparison29:
CumGMC PIi t = α0 +α1GasPricei t +α2Tar get i t +α3Standardsi t +α4Capi t
+α5 ln GDPPCi t +α6NucSharei t +α7H ydroSharei t
+α8WindSharei t +αt Dumt +αi Dumi + εi t+1,
(3.14)
where GasPricei t is the annual state-specific natural gas electrical power price that
reflects the price of gas used by electricity generators. Tar get i t , Standardsi t and
Capi t are dummy variables equal to one if in state i and year t greenhouse gas emis-
sions targets, CO2 performance standards or a cap-and-trade program, respectively,
are in place and equal to zero otherwise. GDPPCi t is the annual real gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita by state. NucSharei t , H ydroSharei t and WindSharei t
are state i’s share of nuclear, hydroelectric and wind energy in state i’s total name-
plate capacity in year t. Dumt and Dumi denote year and state fixed effects, the α’s
are parameters to be estimated and the ε reflects the error term.
Data for the annual state-specific natural gas electrical power price are drawn from
the EIA Natural Gas Summary. The data originally come from the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC), Form-423, and are in nominal dollars per thousand
cubic feet. The price index for GDP from the US Bureau of Economic Affairs (BEA)
is used to transform the nominal prices into constant prices based on the year 2009.
Data on the real GDP per capita are also taken from the BEA and are in 2009-dollars.
The summary statistics on the second-stage variables depicted in Table 3.2 reflect
the high heterogeneity among the states. The maximum real gas price of $11.56
per thousand cubic feet is observed for Georgia in 2005. In the same year, the price
in Alaska was only $3.72 per thousand cubic feet. As for real GDP per capita, the
maximum value of $70,918 is found for Alaska in 2009. This value is more than
twice the minimum value, which is found for Mississippi in 2001.
Similar differences can be seen for the shares of the three most common CO2-free
29An illustrative example is given in Table 3.5, where we use the full time span starting with the
change in emission performance between 2000 and 2001 and then multiply this GMCPI, which
relates measures of t and t + 1, with growth or de-growth rates resulting from all following years.
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Table 3.2: Determinants of CO2 emission performance: summary statistics
Unit Mean SD Min
value
Max
value
Gas price 2009 $ 6.14 2.12 2.16 11.55
Real GDP per capita 2009 $ 45 648 8 519 28 957 70 918
Nuclear share in nameplate capacity % 8.45 8.78 0 41.30
Hydroelectric share in nameplate capacity % 10.33 17.85 0 87.12
Wind share in nameplate capacity % 2.40 4.77 0 30.02
GHG emissions targets 0/1 0.24 0.43 0 1
CO2 performance standards 0/1 0.07 0.25 0 1
Cap and trade 0/1 0.07 0.25 0 1
electricity generation technologies in the states’ total nameplate capacity.30 The low
mean and standard deviation values for the share of wind show that the generation
of electricity from wind is of low relevance in many states in the time period of
the observations. In fact, in 37 of the 48 states the wind share in the nameplate
capacity is below 10% in all years. Noteworthy exceptions are Iowa, with a share of
about 30%, and North Dakota, with a share of about 27% in 2013. The nuclear and
hydroelectric share in nameplate capacity is about 10% on average. Exceptions here
are Idaho, with a hydroelectric share of about 87% in 2000, and New Hampshire
with a nuclear share of about 41% in 2000 and 2001.
Information on state-specific regulatory policies is taken from the website of the
Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES).31 The C2ES collects a variety of
data on state and regional climate actions within the U.S. Table 3.3 lists the states
that have adopted the state-specific regulatory policies to be tested and the dates
when these policies were put in place in each state. The most common policy is
the definition of GHG emissions targets. By 2013, 18 of the 48 states included in
the study had set emission reduction targets, to be achieved by a certain date. The
baseline and target years, as well as the reduction levels, vary among the states. The
most common short-term targets, to be met by 2020, are the reduction of emissions
to 1990 levels (four states) and to 10% below 1990 levels (eight states). In the long-
term, the targets vary between 50% and 85% below the 1990 and 2005 levels. Most
states have a long-term target year of 2050.
30As the share of solar thermal and photovoltaic in total nameplate capacity is far below 1% for almost
all states in the time period of the observations, it is not included in the analysis. Only Arizona,
California, North Carolina, New Jersey, Nevada, and New Mexico show values above 1%. The
maximum value is 4.3% in California in 2013. A similar argument applies to geothermal energy
and pumped storage. While in a limited number of states these technologies play a minor role,
they are not installed at all in the vast majority of states.
31 http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions, last accessed 29.02.2016.
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Table 3.3: State-specific regulatory policies
Year GHG emissions targets CO2 performance
standards
Cap and trade
2000 OR
2001 CT, MA, ME, NH, RI OR
2002 CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, NY OR
2003 CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, NY OR
2004 CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, NY OR, WA
2005 CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, NY, CA, NM OR, WA
2006 CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, NY, CA, NM, AZ OR, WA, CA
2007 CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, NY, CA, NM, AZ, FL, IL,
MN, NJ, OR, WA
OR, WA, CA, MT
2008 CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, NY, CA, NM, AZ, FL, IL,
MN, NJ, OR, WA, CO
OR, WA, CA, MT
2009 CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, NY, CA, NM, AZ, FL, IL,
MN, NJ, OR, WA, CO, MD, MI
OR, WA, CA, MT,
IL
CT, DE, MA, MD,
ME, NH, NJ, NY, RI
2010 CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, NY, CA, NM, AZ, FL, IL,
MN, NJ, OR, WA, CO, MD, MI
OR, WA, CA, MT,
IL
CT, DE, MA, MD,
ME, NH, NJ, NY, RI
2011 CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, NY, CA, NM, AZ, FL, IL,
MN, NJ, OR, WA, CO, MD, MI
OR, WA, CA, MT,
IL
CT, DE, MA, MD,
ME, NH, NJ, NY, RI
2012 CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, NY, CA, NM, AZ, FL, IL,
MN, NJ, OR, WA, CO, MD, MI
OR, WA, CA, MT,
IL, NY
CT, DE, MA, MD,
ME, NH, NY, RI
2013 CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, NY, CA, NM, AZ, FL, IL,
MN, NJ, OR, WA, CO, MD, MI
OR, WA, CA, MT,
IL, NY
CT, DE, MA, MD,
ME, NH, NY, RI,
CA
Note: Arizona (AZ), California (CA), Colorado (CO), Connecticut (CT), Delaware (DE), Florida (FL),
Illinois (IL), Maine (ME), Maryland (MD), Massachusetts (MA), Michigan (MI), Minnesota (MN),
Montana (MT), New Hampshire (NH), New Jersey (NJ), New Mexico (NM), New York (NY), Oregon
(OR), Rhode Island (RI), Washington (WA).
41
3 Competition and Regulation as a Means of Reducing CO2-Emissions
In addition to GHG emissions targets, six states have adopted CO2 performance
standards. The standards and their area of application differ considerably among the
states. While in some states the standards only apply to specific (e.g. baseload) or
new power plants, in others they apply to all power plants. Furthermore, standards
might require generators to reduce emissions from power plants directly to a given
emissions rate per output unit, or they might also allow indirect measures such as,
payments to third-party mitigation projects. Overall, no consistent pattern in the
design of state-level CO2 performance standards is observable.
The last regulatory policy included in our analysis is the implementation of a cap-
and-trade program. Cap-and-trade is a system that sets a decreasing limit on emis-
sions from one or multiple economic sectors. Below the cap there is a market in
which the entities convered by the program can trade carbon allowances. An entity
that emits less than its allocated limit can sell its allowances to an entity that emits
more, and vice versa. The less an individual entity emits, the less it pays. Hence,
there is an economic incentive to reduce emissions.
Within the observed period a cap-and-trade system was only implemented in the
north and Mideast of the U.S. and in California. In its first control period from 2009-
2011 the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) included fossil fuel electricity
generation in ten northern and mid-eastern states (see Table 3.3: Vermont is one
of the ten but is not included in our data set.). All fossil fuel power plants with 25
megawatts or greater capacity had to comply with the cap, with the aim of stabilizing
emissions between 2009 and 2014 and achieving a 10% reduction by 2019. New
Jersey withdrew from the system before the start of the second control period in
2012. Furthermore, in 2013 California implemented an overall emission cap that
applies to all major industrial sources and electric utilities. By 2015 the system was
enlarged to distributors of transportation fuels, natural gas, and other fuels. Each
year the total amount of allowances is reduced by 3% in order to reduce emissions.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Benchmarking results
Table 3.4 reports the CO2 emission efficiency scores for each state for the years 2000,
2006 and 2013, obtained from the linear program given in Equation 3.13. In 2013
the best results are achieved by the New England states Maine (1.00), Rhode Island
(0.95) and Connecticut (0.94), as well as California (0.87) and Oregon (0.80). Con-
42
3.4 Results
sidering the other years, this ranking is stable only for Maine and Rhode Island. In
all years, Maine and Rhode Island are ranked either first or second, reflecting their
exceptionally high shares of electricity generated from natural gas (more than 95%
and 100% in all years, for Maine and Rhode Island respectively).
Table 3.4: CO2 emission efficiency scores per state
State 2000 2006 2013 Rank
2013
State 2000 2006 2013 Rank
2013
Alabama 0.44 0.47 0.57 18 Nebraska 0.41 0.41 0.40 44
Alaska 0.47 0.50 0.51 27 Nevada 0.57 0.69 0.78 8
Arizona 0.48 0.55 0.54 22 New Hampshire 0.64 0.70 13
Arkansas 0.40 0.47 0.48 29 New Jersey 0.54 0.57 0.80 6
California 0.68 0.78 0.87 4 New Mexico 0.47 0.46 0.49 28
Colorado 0.49 0.48 0.46 32 New York 0.56 0.59 0.77 9
Connecticut 0.53 0.73 0.94 3 North Carolina 0.44 0.44 0.54 21
Delaware 0.42 0.43 0.64 14 North Dakota 0.46 0.47 0.45 33
Florida 0.53 0.64 0.73 11 Ohio 0.44 0.44 0.47 30
Georgia 0.44 0.46 0.58 17 Oklahoma 0.47 0.53 0.53 24
Idaho 0.64 0.73 10 Oregon 0.76 0.79 0.80 5
Illinois 0.38 0.39 0.39 46 Pennsylvania 0.44 0.46 0.55 20
Indiana 0.43 0.43 0.43 35 Rhode Island 0.90 0.97 0.95 2
Iowa 0.36 0.37 0.37 48 South Carolina 0.46 0.46 0.51 26
Kansas 0.40 0.40 0.39 47 South Dakota 0.42 0.40 0.42 38
Kentucky 0.45 0.42 0.42 41 Tennessee 0.42 0.41 0.40 45
Louisiana 0.51 0.53 0.59 16 Texas 0.52 0.55 0.57 19
Maine 0.88 1.00 1 Utah 0.56 0.52 0.51 25
Maryland 0.48 0.44 0.41 42 Virginia 0.40 0.41 0.53 23
Massachusetts 0.55 0.70 0.78 7 Washington 0.50 0.55 0.60 15
Michigan 0.44 0.43 0.42 37 West Virginia 0.51 0.47 0.44 34
Minnesota 0.41 0.39 0.42 39 Wisconsin 0.37 0.39 0.42 40
Mississippi 0.45 0.53 0.72 12 Wyoming 0.51 0.49 0.47 31
Missouri 0.41 0.42 0.43 36 Mean 0.48 0.52 0.57
Montana 0.48 0.44 0.41 43 Median 0.46 0.47 0.52
Note: To conserve space, only the values for the first, the middle and the last year of sample
are presented. The values for all years are available from the authors upon request.
The other top performer states show a rather heterogeneous development. For
example, in 2000, Connecticut only reached an efficiency score of 0.53. In the years
to 2013 Connecticut almost doubled this score, reaching a value of 0.94 in 2013.
Interestingly, from 2000 to 2013, Connecticut increased the share of natural gas
in the total electricity generated from coal and natural gas from 56% to 96%. In
contrast, the natural gas shares in California and Oregon increased only slightly,
from, respectively, 98% and 71% in 2000 to 99% and 79% in 2013. The rankings of
California and Oregon vary between second and fifth place within these years.
The low performer states in 2013 are the Midwest states of Iowa (0.37), Kansas
(0.39), Illinois (0.39), and Nebraska (0.40), as well as Tennessee (0.40). Interest-
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ingly, while the low performance states all show a high share for coal generation,
other states with even higher shares perform better. For example, Wyoming, with a
coal share of almost 100%, is ranked at place 31. These results show that, in addi-
tion to the coal and gas capacity mix, the CO2 content of the burned coal and the
overall capacity utilization also influence the efficiency rankings.
As the efficiency scores in Table 3.4 are obtained from a within-year comparison,
they only present a static view of the CO2 emission performance of the states. In
order to evaluate the CO2 emission performance over time, we calculate the GMCPI
defined in Equation 3.8 for each two-year period and each state. The cumulative
GMCPIs over the period 2000-2013 are reported in Table 3.5.
The results show that, on average, the states improved their CO2 emission per-
formance from 2000 to 2013 by about 15%. Furthermore, for 34 of the 48 states
a positive development in the CO2 emission performance is shown. The top five
performers are Connecticut (1.76), Mississippi (1.62), Delaware (1.54), New Jersey
(1.47), and Massachusetts (1.53). The low performers are Montana (0.86), Mary-
land (0.86), West Virginia (0.88), Utah (0.92), and Kentucky (0.92). On average,
the CO2 emission performance of the low performers decreased by about 11% from
2000 to 2013.
As shown in Equations 3.9-3.11, the GMCPI can be decomposed into two compo-
nents. Table 3.6 depicts the cumulative efficiency change and the cumulative best
practice change. First, referring to the cumulative best practice change, the results
indicate a positive rate of technological change over time, on average and for 44 of
the 48 states. The average rate of cumulative best practice change is 13%. While
this result suggests technological improvements for almost all input mixes and lev-
els, it does not indicate whether all states have implemented these improvements.
A state’s positive rate of cumulative best practice change simply indicates a shift
of the state’s relevant portion of the contemporaneous frontier towards the global
frontier, between the first period and the last period. However, it does not indicate
whether the state actually operates on that frontier or causes its own outward shift
(Färe et al., 1994). For example, the highest rate of cumulative best practice change
is shown for Louisiana, and is about 79%. However, we also observe a cumulative
efficiency decrease for Louisiana of about 36%. This means that, for Louisiana’s pro-
duction technology, CO2 reducing innovations occurred over time, but Louisiana was
not able to follow these innovations. Graphically speaking, over the observed period
Louisiana was not able to catch-up to the outwardly shifting contemporaneous fron-
tier towards the global frontier. Overall, Louisiana’s cumulative GMCPI indicates an
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Table 3.5: Cumulative GMCPI per state over the period 2000-2013 (2000 = 1)
State CumGMCPI Rank State CumGMCPI Rank
Alabama 1.31 12 Nebraska 0.99 36
Alaska 1.09 25 Nevada 1.37 8
Arizona 1.13 22 New Hampshire 1.20 16
Arkansas 1.19 18 New Jersey 1.47 4
California 1.28 13 New Mexico 1.02 33
Colorado 0.95 42 New York 1.38 7
Connecticut 1.76 1 North Carolina 1.21 15
Delaware 1.54 3 North Dakota 0.97 39
Florida 1.40 6 Ohio 1.07 27
Georgia 1.32 10 Oklahoma 1.12 24
Idaho 1.33 9 Oregon 1.06 28
Illinois 1.04 30 Pennsylvania 1.26 14
Indiana 0.98 37 Rhode Island 1.06 29
Iowa 1.01 34 South Carolina 1.13 23
Kansas 0.98 38 South Dakota 0.99 35
Kentucky 0.92 44 Tennessee 0.96 41
Louisiana 1.15 20 Texas 1.08 26
Maine 1.16 19 Utah 0.92 45
Maryland 0.86 47 Virginia 1.31 11
Massachusetts 1.53 5 Washington 1.20 17
Michigan 0.97 40 West Virginia 0.88 46
Minnesota 1.03 32 Wisconsin 1.15 21
Mississippi 1.62 2 Wyoming 0.93 43
Missouri 1.03 31 Mean 1.15
Montana 0.86 48 Median 1.11
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increase in its CO2 emission performance of about 15%.
Table 3.6: Cumulative GMCPI decomposition per state over the period 2000-2013 (2000 =
1)
State CumEC CumBPC State CumEC CumBPC
Alabama 1.10 1.19 Nebraska 0.87 1.14
Alaska 1.02 1.07 Nevada 1.08 1.27
Arizona 0.90 1.25 New Hampshire 1.13 1.06
Arkansas 1.14 1.05 New Jersey 1.35 1.09
California 1.24 1.04 New Mexico 0.88 1.17
Colorado 0.76 1.25 New York 1.28 1.08
Connecticut 1.67 1.05 North Carolina 1.13 1.07
Delaware 1.43 1.08 North Dakota 1.16 0.84
Florida 1.31 1.07 Ohio 0.93 1.16
Georgia 1.25 1.06 Oklahoma 1.05 1.07
Idaho 0.78 1.66 Oregon 0.86 1.23
Illinois 0.96 1.08 Pennsylvania 1.34 0.94
Indiana 0.84 1.17 Rhode Island 1.00 1.06
Iowa 0.88 1.15 South Carolina 0.96 1.17
Kansas 0.92 1.07 South Dakota 0.89 1.12
Kentucky 0.76 1.21 Tennessee 0.83 1.16
Louisiana 0.64 1.79 Texas 1.03 1.05
Maine 1.10 1.06 Utah 0.99 0.94
Maryland 0.68 1.27 Virginia 1.23 1.06
Massachusetts 1.31 1.08 Washington 0.95 1.26
Michigan 0.91 1.06 West Virginia 0.83 1.05
Minnesota 0.85 1.21 Wisconsin 1.08 1.06
Mississippi 1.49 1.09 Wyoming 1.00 0.93
Missouri 0.98 1.06 Mean 1.03 1.13
Montana 0.85 1.02 Median 0.99 1.08
An opposing picture is shown for, for example, Rhode Island. The cumulative effi-
ciency change value of 1 and the equal cumulative best practice change and GMCPI
values of 1.06 suggest that Rhode Island in all years operated on the best practice
frontier and pushed it’s relevant portion outwards towards the global frontier by
technological innovations. Overall, Rhode Island realized an increase in its CO2
emission performance of about 6% as a result of technological innovations.
A third example is given by North Dakota. North Dakota is one of the four states
for which we observe a negative rate of technological change over time, namely
−16%. This result indicates an inward shift of North Dakota’s relevant portion of
the contemporaneous frontier away from the global frontier. Such a result occurs if
the states that determine this portion of the frontier experience a deterioration of
their technological performance over time. In fact, Wyoming’s cumulative efficiency
change value of 1 and its cumulative best practice change value of 0.93 suggest that
Wyoming is one of these states. Other states may have also belonged to this group
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in some years, but have been able to compensate for this in other years by input
adjustments.
Altogether, our results on cumulative efficiency change and cumulative best prac-
tice change suggest that some innovative states shifted the contemporaneous frontier
towards the global frontier by implementing technological innovations. However,
the decline in cumulative efficiency change for 24 of the 48 states shows that half of
the states were not able to follow these innovations and to catch-up to the new best
practice frontier.
A better view of the CO2 emission performance over time is shown in Figure 3.4,
which depicts the cumulative GMCPI trends for the top and bottom performers for
the period 2000-2013. While the lower part of the figure shows a relatively steady
decline in the CO2 emission performance of the bottom performers over time, the
upper part indicates a relatively strong increase in the CO2 emission performance
of the top performers, particularly after 2008. This may be a first indication that
the significant decrease in the natural gas price after 2008 is a major driver of CO2-
reduced electricity generation from fossil fuel power plants, although this is yet to
be proven.
3.4.2 Second-stage regression results
Table 3.7 present the estimation results for Equation 3.14. As reverse causality, that
is, not only regulation has an impact on the CO2 emission performance but the CO2
emission performance also has an impact on the regulation, might be a problem, we
first conduct a test of endogeneity. The test provides moderate evidence against the
null hypothesis that the regulatory variables are exogenous (p=0.031). Therefore,
we estimate two model specifications: one treating the regulatory variables as ex-
ogenous, and one treating the regulatory variables as endogenous. In the latter we
apply the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator and instrument the regulatory
variables with their first lags as well as with a dummy variable equal to one in the
case of a governor from the democrat party, and zero otherwise. Both specifications
include state and year fixed effects.
The results of the two specifications are very similar. The regression diagnostics for
the 2SLS specification suggest that the instrumental variables used for the regulatory
variables are sufficient. The under-identification test rejects the null hypothesis that
the model is not identified (p<0.01), the over-identification test fails to reject the
null hypothesis that the instruments are not valid (p>0.50), and the Kleinbergen-
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Figure 3.4: Cumulative GMCPI trends for the top and bottom performers for the period 2000-
2013
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Table 3.7: Determinants of CO2 emission performance: estimation results
Fixed effects 2SLS
Variable Parameter Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Constant α0 2.356
∗∗ (1.191) −
Gas price α1 −0.011∗∗ (0.004) −0.011∗∗∗ (0.004)
GHG emissions targets α2 0.003 (0.018) 0.040 (0.029)
CO2 performance standards α3 0.043 (0.029) 0.022 (0.038)
Cap-and-trade system α4 0.077
∗∗∗ (0.026) 0.137∗∗∗ (0.042)
Real GDP per capita (log) α5 −0.097 (0.110) −0.126 (0.119)
Nuclear share in nameplate
capacity
α6 −0.014∗∗ (0.006) −0.014∗∗ (0.006)
Hydroelectric share in
nameplate capacity
α7 −0.010∗∗ (0.004) −0.009∗∗ (0.004)
Wind share in nameplate
capacity
α8 −0.008∗∗∗ (0.001) −0.007∗∗∗ (0.001)
State fixed effects αi yes yes
Year fixed effects αt yes yes
R-squared R2 0.802 0.490
Adjusted R-quared R2(adj.) 0.767 0.400
Endogeneity test P-value − 0.071
Underidentification test P-value − 0.000
Overidentification test P-value − 0.500
Kleinbergen-Paap F-statistic − 15.258
Observations N 437 436
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Instruments for 2SLS: First lags of regulatory
variables and dummy variable for party of the governor. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗: significant at the 1%-, 5%-, and
10%-level. All estimations were performed in Stata 13.1 using the official areg command and the
user-written xtivreg2 command developed by Schaffer (2012).
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Paap F-statistic is greater than the rule of thumb of 10 (15.258), indicating that weak
instruments are no problem.
The results in Table 3.7 indicate a statistically significant impact of the natural
gas price, and a regional cap-and-trade-system, as well as the state’s shares of nu-
clear, hydroelectric and wind energy in total nameplate capacity, on the state’s CO2
emission performance of fossil fuel power plants. As expected, an increase in the
natural gas price has a negative impact on the cumulative GMCPI. In both specifi-
cations the estimated coefficient of −0.011 suggests that a $1 increase in the price
decreases the cumulative GMCPI by one percentage point. Similar results are shown
for the shares of the most common CO2-free electricity generation technologies in
the state’s total nameplate capacity. The estimated coefficients of between −0.007
and −0.014 suggest that an additional percentage point in the shares decreases the
cumulative GMCPI by between 0.7 and 1.4 percentage points. This result can be
explained by a lower incentive for states with a high share of CO2-free electricity
generation capacity to reduce the C02 emissions from their fossil fuel generation
capacity.
Finally, among the regulatory variables we only find a statistically significant im-
pact for a regional cap-and-trade system. The estimated coefficients indicate that the
implementation of such a system increases the cumulative GMCPI by 7.7 and 13.7
percentage points, respectively, for the two specifications. This result emphasizes
that stringent regulation is the most important driver of the states’ CO2 emission
performance.
3.5 Conclusions
CO2 emissions from fossil-fueled electricity generation in the U.S. have dropped con-
siderably in the last decade. As U.S. states seem to show varying success in reducing
these CO2 emissions, the objective of this article was to compare the relative CO2
emission performance of fossil fuel power plants across the states for the period
2000-2013. In particular, we analyzed whether or not the inter-fuel competition
induced by the shale gas revolution and/or state-specific CO2 regulations have con-
tributed to the developments over time.
For a better understanding of the state-specific CO2 emission performance over
time we first applied a nonparametric benchmarking approach. In doing this, we did
not just consider a simple measure of CO2 intensity, such as CO2 emissions per unit
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of electricity produced, but we also took other factors, such as fuel consumption and
nameplate capacity, into account. This approach allowed us to measure the relative
CO2 emission performance across states, considering both the input and the output
dimension of the states’ fossil fuel electricity generation profiles, and hence provided
a more comprehensive picture of the states’ relative CO2 emission performance than
a simple output-oriented CO2 intensity measure.
In particular, we used a ‘global’ Malmquist CO2 performance index (GMCPI) to
measure each state’s performance against a global benchmarking technology. The
cumulative GMCPI obtained can be interpreted as a total factor CO2 emission per-
formance index between 2000 and 2013. Overall, we find that the CO2 emission
performance across all states improved, on average, by 15% from 2000 to 2013.
Decomposing the performance index into its elements, efficiency change and tech-
nological change, revealed that this development was mainly due to technological
progress. However, the observed efficiency decline in 24 of the 48 states shows that
half of the states were not fully able to implement the technological improvements
introduced in some innovative states.
To test whether fuel competition and/or emissions regulations led to an improve-
ment in the CO2 emission performance over time, we regressed the cumulative GM-
CPI on natural gas prices, regulatory policies and a number of other state-specific
factors. Altogether, the results support the argument of increased inter-fuel competi-
tion induced by the shale gas revolution and the positive impact of this on electricity-
related CO2 emissions. That is, lower natural gas prices come with a higher state-
specific CO2 emission performance over time. Furthermore, considering state-level
regulatory policies, the results suggest a positive impact of regional cap-and-trade
programs on the state-specific CO2 emission performance over time.
As for the other two regulatory policies considered, there may be several reasons
why we do not find them to have a statistically significant impact on the states’ CO2
emission performance. First, the setting of a GHG emissions target does not nec-
essarily come with a set of concrete actions. In most states there is a long period
between the announcement of a target and the implementation of mandatory regu-
lations within the individual sectors. Hence, GHG emissions targets can be seen as
a soft type of regulatory policy rather than a stringent set of actions. Second, the
design of CO2 performance standards varies enormously among the states. While
some standards may have an impact, others may not. In all likelihood, this het-
erogeneity prevents us from finding a statistically significant impact of state-specific
CO2 performance standards in general.
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Altogether, we conclude that lower gas prices and stringent CO2 regulations are
suitable means to reduce electricity-related CO2 emissions. However, although the
effect of lower natural gas prices is statistically significant, it should be carefully
interpreted. Taken literally, a $5 drop in the natural gas price, as observed on the
national level between 2008 and 2013, is estimated to increase a state’s CO2 emis-
sion performance by about 5 percentage points. Whether or not this effect is small
or large in environmental terms cannot be clearly answered within our framework.
A more comprehensive evaluation should include all the economic and environmen-
tal costs (and benefits): in the case of natural gas, this also incorporates the envi-
ronmental costs resulting from shale gas exploitation. A similar argument applies
to our estimated effect of cap-and-trade regulation. While regional cap-and-trade
programs seem to be very effective in reducing CO2 emissions, policy makers should
carefully weigh the costs and benefits of such programs before considering a regional
and sectoral expansion.
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4 The Impact of Advanced Metering
Infrastructure on Residential Electricity
Consumption - Evidence from California
One important pillar in the debate about energy-saving measures addresses energy
conservation. In this paper, we focus on the deployment of advanced metering in-
frastructure to reduce the impact of limited information and bounded rationality of
consumers. For California, we empirically analyze the influence of a statewide and
policy-driven installation of advanced metering infrastructure. We apply synthetic
control methods to derive a suitable control group. We then conduct a Difference-
in-Differences estimation and find a significant negative impact of smart meters on
monthly residential electricity consumption that ranges from 6.1 to 6.4%. Second,
such an impact only occurs in non-heating periods and does not fade out over the
analyzed time period.
4.1 Introduction
In the light of exacerbated discussions on climate targets and emission reduction
goals, energy-saving measures have become increasingly important. In the residen-
tial sector, such measures have to account for specific characteristics such as limited
information and bounded rationality. Although there should be a natural interest in
reducing electricity consumption, it is common knowledge that the savings potential
is yet to be leveraged. In this paper, we analyze the impact of advanced metering
infrastructure (AMI) on residential electricity consumption. The AMI feeds back
real-time information on electricity consumption and enables bidirectional commu-
nication between the consumer and the respective service utility.
Since, from a consumer‘s perspective, cost recovery after installing AMI is at least
questionable, pilot tests and policy-induced measures are the prevalent ways of eval-
uating smart-meter deployment. The respective impact of smart meters on electric-
ity consumption may differ in both frameworks. In pilot tests, a loss of generality
resulting from small samples and the Hawthorne effect, whereby individuals alter
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their behavior in response to their awareness of being observed, may be relevant.
Therefore, we focus on a statewide policy measure and identify a lack of empirical
evidence in the existing literature. On the basis of our analyses, decision makers
may assess the effectiveness of a policy-driven deployment of smart meters.
We analyze the impact of AMI based on empirical evidence from California. Fol-
lowing the Californian Energy Crisis in 2001, the government issued a decision re-
garding statewide deployment of smart meters in the Energy Action Plan II of 2005.
As a consequence, the three major service utilities committed themselves to installing
AMI right across their service areas beginning in 2008. As such, smart meters provide
consumers and utilities with more detailed consumption information.32 We compare
the Californian development of residential electricity consumption over time with
the respective one in a synthetic control group named ‘Synthetic California’. We
construct this control group using synthetic control methods in order to resemble
Californian characteristics (Abadie et al., 2010). Furthermore, we isolate the effect
of advanced metering infrastructure by filtering out distorting effects such as energy
savings related to energy-efficiency measures.
We find a significant reduction of the average monthly residential electricity con-
sumption in California that effectively ranges between 6.1 and 6.4% during our pe-
riod of observation. However, we identify a clear seasonal pattern of electricity sav-
ings, showing significant reductions of electricity consumption only in non-heating
periods. We suggest that this may be due to the fact that some household appliances
are more likely to be substitutable in non-heating periods and thus provide higher
saving potentials. On the contrary, heating represents a more basic need and there-
fore electricity consumption patterns may be less likely to change during heating
periods.33 Finally, our results suggest that the impact of additional informational
feedback on electricity consumption is continuous during our period of observation.
We reckon that, at least within the seven years under analysis, smart-meter deploy-
ment is a suitable way to achieve overall electricity savings in the residential sector.
However, for service utilities, an ongoing assessment of the respective impact on elec-
tricity consumption may be beneficial to foster persistent effects. Finally, seasonal
fluctuations with respect to the impact of AMI suggest that energy-conservation mea-
sures should be complemented by other energy-saving measures in order to achieve
a general and continuous reduction in electricity consumption.
32The smart meters may provide data with higher temporal resolution and device-specific information.
33In the US, up to 65% of households have electric space heating and thus a significant impact on
electricity consumption is expected.
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4.2 Literature Background
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides the
main literature background. In Section 4.3, we depict the identification strategy for
measuring the impact of smart meters on residential electricity consumption. We
then present the most relevant characteristics of residential electricity consumption
in Section 4.4 and furthermore provide a broad overview on energy-saving measures
that are relevant for the analysis. Our applied empirical approach and the data are
described in Section 4.5, and the respective results are discussed in Section 4.6.
Finally, we draw conclusions in Section 4.7.
4.2 Literature Background
When analyzing the impact of AMI on residential electricity consumption, we es-
sentially expect the respective influence to be triggered by additional informational
feedback. The paper at hand in a broader context is hence positioned in behavioral
economics. One important pillar for such literature deals with aspects surrounding
bounded rationality, which may serve as an explanatory approach for the actual be-
havior of consumers. As the provision of informational feedback directly addresses
the limited information of consumers, we first focus on some basic principles in the
literature. According to Simon (1957), the term ‘bounded rationality’ refers to the
rationality that is exhibited by the economic behavior of humans. More precisely,
rationality is assumed to be bounded due to the limited information that individ-
uals have at certain reference points in time. Naturally, how decisions are taken,
assuming that individuals first face a lack of perfect information and second are
not even capable of processing all the information they encounter, remains an open
question. The joint answer given by behavioral economists and psychologists has
directed researchers to the aspect of time itself. Over time, decisions of individuals
are influenced by new information that, after being ‘fed back’ to the individuals, trig-
gers adjustments in their decisions. Such an informational feedback (or ‘learning’)
re-aligns initial thinking, punishes deviant behavior, and leads to the amelioration of
decisions (Arthur, 1991, 1994, North, 1994). Arthur (1994) labels this behavioral
‘process’ as inductive reasoning, implying that the individual initially assumes a va-
riety of working hypotheses, acts upon the most credible ones, and then replaces
them by new ones if they fail to work. Thus, the interplay between economic and
psychological research evidently can not be neglected (Rabin, 1998, Simon, 1986).
The essence of bounded rationality and informational feedback has inspired a
vast body of prior research, not only in the field of energy (e.g., DiClemente et al.,
55
4 The Impact of Advanced Metering Infrastructure on Residential Electricity Consumption
2001). Above all, the impact of providing feedback on consumption is of particular
interest. In the related literature, such an effect has most often been measured
with the help of empirical work that is constrained by data and/or the experimental
design itself. Therefore, the setting of experimental studies and the selection of
variables are crucial.34 This paper addresses the relevance of bounded rationality
in the energy sector. In this context, informational feedback incorporates a measure
that is supposed to effect an overall reduction of electricity consumption based on
additional information. A summary of experimental energy-related studies has been
published by Faruqui et al. (2010). The authors conducted their survey based on
pilot programs in the United States, investigating the effect of in-home displays on
consumer behavior, and found that reductions in consumption from such programs
reached 7% on average. More recent research has been conducted by Gans et al.
(2013) dealing with the effect of informational feedback on residential electricity
consumption. In that study, the authors analyze the impact of smart meters in a
large-scale natural experiment in Northern Ireland. They find that the decline in
residential electricity consumption induced through smart meters ranges between
11 and 17%.
Targeting an overall reduction of electricity demand, the literature distinguishes
between three different types of energy-saving measures. Despite the energy-conser-
ving impact of informational feedback, electricity consumption can also be influ-
enced by energy-efficiency programs and demand response. Whereas informational
feedback induces a behavioral change so that ‘using less electricity’ results as the
outcome, energy efficiency aims at a reduced energy usage while maintaining a
comparable level of service (Boshell & Veloza, 2008, Davito et al., 2010, Gillingham
et al., 2006). Efficiency is thus closely linked to the installation of energy-efficient
technologies within households such as freezers, refrigerators, dishwashers, light
bulbs, and other appliances. In contrast to these direct measures, demand response
is related to the electricity market itself. Despite a reduction of peak demand that
was observed in field experiments on dynamic pricing (Faruqui & Sergici, 2010),
Joskow & Wolfram (2012) stress that the overall penetration of demand response
measures in the US has been low so far. For California, the impact of demand re-
sponse programs is still negligible today. In this paper, we focus on the isolated
impact of deploying AMI and thus position this article in the literature analyzing
energy-conservation measures.
Recently, behavioral literature has focused on the growing appreciation of how
34A review of such features from experimental studies can be found in Selten (1998).
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non-price interventions can affect consumer behavior. As such, informational feed-
back provided to the consumer is pivotal in order to increase the household‘s re-
sponsiveness and likewise influence its electricity consumption. Among others, All-
cott (2011) reports that providing social norm information induces consumers to
conserve electricity. Allcott & Rogers (2014) expand the analysis on social norms by
using data from the Opower program, in which home energy reports based on social
comparison are repeatedly provided to residential electricity consumers.
Supplementing prior research, we focus on the impact of AMI in a large-scale
framework rather than analyzing short-term pilot programs. Moreover, the litera-
ture so far gives a long list of issues related to the explanatory power of pilot tests.
Such aspects cover, inter alia, the representative nature of the sample, the time hori-
zon, additional and distorting monetary incentives, and measurement errors. Fur-
thermore, a Hawthorne effect may be identified, reflecting the fact that people may
alter their behavior when they know that they are participating in an experimental
study (Adair, 1984). Thus, the transferability of results from pilot tests to a larger
and more general context is at least questionable. We intend to fill this gap by de-
riving an empirical approach that will allow us to draw conclusions from an energy-
conservation measure induced by statewide policy. Complementing prior research,
we are thus able to assess the effectiveness of a policy-driven deployment of smart
meters in the context of energy-conservation measures.
4.3 Identification Strategy
In the US, smart-meter35 deployment in several states is fostered by legislation.
While some states have not passed any smart-meter legislation yet, others have
already fully adopted smart-meter plans. Figure 4.1 depicts the status of smart-
metering legislation across the US states.
We use the dichotomy of states with significant impact of smart-metering legisla-
tion and states with negligible smart-meter penetration rates in order to derive an
experimental setting. On the one hand, we identify the statewide and policy-induced
smart-meter deployment in California as a treatment that allows us to analyze the
impact of smart meters on consumption. On the other hand, states that do not yet
have any smart-meter penetration may serve as a control group.
35Such smart meters are part of the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI). For more details on AMI
see Section 4.8.1 of the Appendix.
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Figure 4.1: Smart-metering legislation across the US states (Energy Information Administra-
tion 2011)
The installation of smart meters refers to a short and precisely controllable period,
essentially ranging from 2009 to 2011. Being a statewide measure, all residential
customers are affected in the same manner. By analyzing the development of elec-
tricity consumption before, during, and after the deployment of smart meters, we
are thus able to clearly relate back possible changes to the trigger event. We further-
more isolate the respective impact in question by controlling for the other electricity
saving impacts (i.e. energy efficiency and self-consumption from renewable ener-
gies).
We would like to observe the development of residential electricity consumption in
a population that faces the introduction of informational feedback over time (treat-
ment group) and the respective control group. The control group should ideally re-
produce the characteristics of the population that experiences the treatment. Since
the characteristics influencing residential electricity consumption are heterogeneous
across the US states, we do not expect a single state to resemble Californian con-
sumption characteristics appropriately. In this paper, we therefore apply synthetic
control methods in order to evaluate what might be a control group that meets the
above outlined requirements. We thereby aim to guarantee quasi-randomness. In a
next step, we then conduct a Difference-in-Differences estimation to test for causality
as well as to quantify the reduction effect in scope.
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4.4 The Californian Case
In order to evaluate the impact of deploying smart meters in California, it is first nec-
essary to understand the most relevant drivers of residential electricity consumption
and its development over time. This is crucial since, besides the deployment of
smart-meter infrastructure, further political measures were adopted that tackle is-
sues related to energy conservation, energy efficiency, and demand response. When
it comes to energy savings, California is one of the most ambitious states, with vari-
ous measures having been adopted to achieve an overall decrease of electricity con-
sumption and thus greenhouse gas emissions. Beginning with the energy crisis in
California in 2001, policy makers decided to foster an increase of energy efficiency
with a particular focus on the residential sector.
In this regard, there were repeatedly updated energy action plans, all of which
defined goals for energy consumption (California Energy Commission, 2003). These
action plans mainly aimed at:
• meeting energy growth needs as well as optimizing resource efficiency and
energy conservation;
• reducing electricity demand;
• ensuring security of gas and electricity supply including the provision of an
appropriate infrastructure;
• achieving goals with respect to renewable energies and distributed electricity
generation.
In order to tackle the above aims, the Energy Action Plan considered measures fos-
tering voluntary dynamic pricing, explicit incentives for demand reduction, rewards
for demand response, energy-efficiency investments, energy-conservation measures,
energy-efficiency programs, and programs that support improvements of energy ef-
ficiency when it comes to buildings and devices. Furthermore, within the scope of
the Energy Action Plan 2 in 2005, the government issued a decision for a large-
scale deployment of smart meters (California Energy Commission, 2005). As a
consequence, the three major investor-owned utilities (IOUs), namely Pacific Gas
& Electric (PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE), and San Diego Gas & Electric
(SDG&E), started programs that deployed AMI within their service areas. As de-
picted in Figure 4.2, these IOUs cover more than 75% of all customer accounts36 in
36These numbered 13,845,610 in December 2015 and the respective energy consumption is related
to a share greater than 70%.
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California (2015).
Figure 4.2: Investor-Owned Utilities (IOUs) and the respective share of Californian customer
accounts (2015, Dec.)
Below, we explain the most relevant types of measures and their impact on res-
idential electricity consumption in more detail. We distinguish between measures
related to energy efficiency of buildings and devices, demand response triggered
by electricity price schemes, and energy conservation including, among others, the
deployment of AMI.
Demand Response Through Electricity Tariff Design
‘Load shifting’ is a typical demand response from electricity consumers. It occurs if
consumers are able to react to price signals from the electricity market. Technically,
a consumer reduces load in response to a signal from a service provider or grid op-
erator. Today, electricity consumers in the residential sector in California face either
a tiered tariff scheme or a time-of-use pricing scheme. In tiered tariff schemes, elec-
tricity prices are relative to a ‘baseline’ consumption of electricity within a defined
territory. As such, the tariff scheme follows a typical quantity-dependent pricing that
varies across predefined blocks of usage. The number of tiers offered and temporal
definitions with respect to peak, semi-peak, and off-peak vary among IOUs, and peak
prices can be more than twice the off-peak ones.37 In general, consumers receive
their electricity and gas bills at the end of each month, following a standardized
30-days billing cycle. Billing contains information on daily gas and electricity usage
gathered by smart meters throughout the cycle. Consumers are thus able to identify
37We provide two simplified versions of residential tiered and time-of-use schedules in Section 4.8.7.
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monthly variations of gas and electricity usage on daily and monthly levels.38
A two-tiered tariff had already been implemented in California prior to the en-
ergy crisis in 2000. However, with the energy crisis and the inconvenience caused
by blackouts that were induced by supply shortages, regulators enhanced the tier
structure by introducing five tiers. These were removed again in 2013 due to on-
going discussions on tier design and, as of today, Californian tariff design relies on
time-of-use pricing that distinguishes between peak and off-peak times. Addition-
ally, the implementation of real-time pricing has so far been ruled out as an option
in California.
A change in tiered electricity tariff design could potentially provoke slight changes
in overall consumption levels. This may, for example, be the case if load shifting
causes a decrease in electricity consumption in peak periods which is even higher
than the respective increase in off-peak periods. Within this paper, we assume that
there is no significant impact of implementing more or less tiers on the absolute elec-
tricity consumption. To support this hypothesis, we test the assumption of parallel
trends within our empirical analysis. We would expect potential distorting effects
related to a change in the electricity tariff design, if any, to be uncovered within this
procedure since the introduction of five tiers in California was in the pre-treatment
periods.
Energy Efficiency
Besides regulatory efforts to ensure security of supply through tier design, nu-
merous energy-efficiency policy measures which are directed towards a reduction
of energy consumption exist for California (Office of Energy Efficiency and Renew-
able Energy, 2016). The majority of energy-efficiency measures are so-called rebate
programs.39 The three major IOUs, PG&E, SDG&E, and SCE, have all offered energy-
efficiency rebate programs for energy-efficient technologies since 2006. Within these
programs, consumers willing to replace equipment with energy star labelled de-
vices receive a per unit rebate.40 Such incentives are particularly designed to reduce
load through state-of-the-art devices. While the utility level remains constant with
the same service offered (i.e., for example, cooling in the fridge), less electricity is
needed to ensure this service. Empirical evidence reveals a need to distinguish be-
38Sample bills from PG&E, SDG&E and SCE can be found under the service portal from each IOU.
39Additionally, appliance standards on a national level have been implemented in the Appliance Effi-
ciency Regulations for California in 2006 as well as the Public Benefits Funds for Renewables and
Efficiency launched in 1998.
40Further details on the applicable residential equipment are provided at the website
’http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/’.
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tween different devices. Light bulbs, refrigerators, and freezers provide rather robust
empirical evidence for electricity reduction if replaced within households. Thus, we
expect a significant impact of energy-efficiency measures on electricity consumption
(Gillingham et al., 2006). We therefore account for energy savings related to energy
efficiency by adjusting electricity consumption data so that the impact of informa-
tional feedback can be studied independently.41
Energy Conservation
Finally, a change of consumption behavior is another way to achieve a reduction
of electricity consumption. Through behavioral changes, ‘consuming less electricity’
with a given technology portfolio is feasible. However, information on the consump-
tion must be revealed in such a way that consumers are able to make informed de-
cisions. As bounded as these decisions may be, decisions change and, in most cases,
may improve if such information is provided to consumers. In this paper, we focus
on the three major IOUs in California, which are adopting plans to distribute smart
meters to all households in their respective service areas. In fact, these plans were
transformed into physical deployment of smart meters, as depicted in Figure 4.3.
The deployment of AMI began in 2008, and first achieved a penetration rate above
10% in 2009.
Figure 4.3: Share of Californian (three major IOUs) households with AMI (smart meters)
over time
41For more details, see Section 4.5.
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As of 2011 the share of Californian households with AMI corresponds to the share
of customer accounts covered by the three major IOUs.42
Households having installed AMI with the respective smart meters are now able
to track their daily electricity consumption via a meter on the device. Additionally,
consumption data are processed by the utility and, as in the case of SDG&E, for
instance, are provided to the customer via on online tool. With the help of the
customer tool, households are able to check their gas and electric usage on a daily
basis. By connecting a home area network to the smart meter, households are able
to track energy consumption information and more details on their energy-usage
profile. Most commonly, thermostats and in-home displays are state of the art in
such technical setups (San Diego Gas and Electricity, 2016).
4.5 Data
We base our empirical analysis on variables that may have information on both fluc-
tuations of residential electricity consumption over time and the respective differ-
ences between the states. We use monthly state-specific data, and in the following
we briefly depict the variables we use as well as the respective sources.
4.5.1 Dependent Variable: Residential Electricity Consumption
We define the dependent variable in order to make it possible to isolate the impact of
AMI on residential electricity consumption from other policy measures that coincide
with the deployment of smart meters and that may also influence residential elec-
tricity consumption. We therefore correct data on residential electricity consumption
provided by the IOUs for both own consumption related to residential photovoltaic
(PV) electricity generation and electricity savings achieved through energy-efficiency
programs. That is to say, we mimic the development of residential electricity con-
sumption as if there was no treatment besides smart meters. The respective formula
is depicted in Equation 4.1.
Demand res,ad jm,s = Demand
res,bil led
m,s
+ Sel f Consumptionres,PVm,s
+ Savingsres,eem,s
(4.1)
42The share of Californian households in services areas that are covered by the three major IOUs may
vary over time.
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Our initial data on residential electricity consumption consists of monthly (m)
state-specific (s) electricity sales in the residential sector, which we label Salesresm,s. As
far as California is concerned, we only include data for the three major IOUs, PG&E,
SCE, and SDG&E, in line with our identification strategy. Since the IOUs cover the
major share (i.e. > 75%) of residential customers in California, we assume that
there is no loss of representative nature. In the next step, we divide Salesresm,s by the
respective number of customer accounts in order to get the average monthly electric-
ity consumption per household for which consumers are billed (Demand res,bil ledm,s ).
We use this relative measure in order to compare residential electricity consumption
in different states independently of the total level of consumption, which may dif-
fer. As outlined above, we now account for the average electricity generation from
PV systems, which replaces electricity purchased from the grid. In general, Califor-
nia uses a billing system that is called net metering. The essence of this procedure
refers to households being directly billed for their total electricity purchase minus
the amount of energy that they feed back into the grid. Thus, there is a direct in-
centive for self-consumption of electricity generated from renewable energy sources.
This self-consumed energy (Sel f ConsumptionPV,residentialm,s ) has to be added to the
basic electricity consumption data in order to get unbiased values.43
Second, we adjust our data for residential electricity savings that result from en-
ergy efficiency (ee) programs (Savingsres,eem,s ). The respective data are collected from
the individual service utilities in the US states and are listed in Table 4.1.44 Such
data are based on the technical savings potential, which is the number of residential
devices that face a specific efficiency upgrade multiplied by the respective electric-
ity consumption.45 However, it is not clear whether or not the data are equal to
the actual reduction in electricity consumption. First, rebound effects may not be
ruled out. The existing literature, however, provides little support for such an in-
crease in energy use, which is known as backfire (Gillingham et al., 2015). Second,
Fowlie et al. (2015) found that projected savings from energy-efficiency programs
may exceed actual reductions many times over. We therefore aim to control whether
measurement errors with regard to energy efficiency savings may bias our empiri-
cal results. In the context of our identification strategy, we explicitly guarantee that
smart meters are accessible at the time of the defined treatment period starting in
43For more details on the calculation methodology, see Section 4.8.5.
44We restrict our analysis to residential efficiency programs in California, New York, and New Mex-
ico since those are the relevant states resulting from the synthetic control methods according to
Section 4.6.1.
45In the example of New York, the data are furthermore corrected for free-rider and spillover effects
(New York State Department of Public Service, 2016).
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2009. As there is a time lag between significant energy-efficiency savings begin-
ning in 200646 and the treatment, we are able to control for the accuracy of the
methodology in filtering out the impact of energy-efficiency measures by testing for
the assumption of parallel trends before the treatment.
As regards the data references for California, we rely on the California Energy
Efficiency Statistics for the three major IOUs of interest (California Public Utilities
Commission, 2016), for New York we take state-wide Energy Efficiency Portfolio
Standard (EEPS) Program Electricity Savings Data (New York Office of Information
Technology Services, 2016), and for New Mexico we review annual efficiency re-
ports published by the major service utility47 (Public Service Company New Mexico,
2016). An overview on the respective data is provided in Table 4.1. Whenever only
a subset of utilities provides energy savings data, we restrict our empirical analysis
to the average residential electricity consumption within the respective service area.
However, the corresponding utilities that provide data cover the majority of house-
holds in their states and thus we assume their representative nature. By now adding
Savingsres,eem,s , we finally get the average adjusted residential electricity consumption
per household (Demand res,ad jm,s ), which we use as the dependent variable within our
empirical framework.
Table 4.1: Energy efficiency savings data
State Utilities Period of time Resolution
California PG&E, SCE, SDG&E 2006-2015 Monthly
New York Statewide 2008-2015 Monthly
New Mexico PNM 2008-2015 Monthly
4.5.2 Explanatory Variables
By using panel data, we account for both cross-sectional and cross-temporal dif-
ferences within the US states. Since we encounter varying temporal and spatial
resolutions among our explanatory variables, we have to adjust some of our data
in order to perform our estimation approach. For instance, household survey data
are only available on census region level in most cases. Thus, we first address this
spatial issue by assigning federal states to the census regions where necessary. As a
46The development of energy-efficiency savings in California is illustrated in Figure 4.7 in Sec-
tion 4.8.2.
47This is the Public Service Company of New Mexico, which covers more than 50% of all customer
accounts in New Mexico.
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consequence, we face a minor loss of cross-sectional explanatory power. Second, for
the chosen period between 2002 and 2015, we need to distinguish between continu-
ously updated data with monthly observations, yearly available data, and household
survey data based on observations in 2001, 2005, and 2009. For some survey data,
we are able to add data for the years 2011 and 2013. In order to obtain an overall
monthly and state-specific dataset, we use previous observations if no updated data
are available.
Table 4.2 gives an overview of all variables that are used in our empirical analysis.
Furthermore, it provides further details such as a brief explanation of each vari-
able and depicts the respective sources. Key to our identification strategy is the de-
ployment status of AMI (Energy Information Administration, 2016b). It reflects the
treatment under analysis by measuring the progress of installation of smart meters
by households over time. We furthermore include explanatory variables concerning
the employment level, wages, residential electricity sales, customer accounts, and
electricity prices that are published by the US Energy Information Administration
(EIA) or the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). It is worth mentioning that the elec-
tricity price is calculated as an average value across all tariff tiers. Furthermore, the
EIA also provides data on residential electricity consumption, which are the basis
for the derivation of the dependent variable. Data are provided on a monthly and
state-specific level.
In addition, we include climate data. More precisely, heating degree days (HDDs)
and cooling degree days (C DDs) are calculated based on per state temperature val-
ues that we obtain from the meteorological data forms of the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion, 2016).48
Complementing these data, we add data reflecting household characteristics with
a focus on electricity usage behavior and appliances. Such data are taken from the
Residential Energy Consumption Survey (RECS) and the American Household Sur-
vey (AHS) for three and five reference points in time, respectively, namely 2001,
2005, 2009, 2011, and 2013. The survey data consist of different technologies and
the percentage of households using specific electrical appliances. For instance, we
include data on the average number of refrigerators per household, the share of
households that use electric heating, and the usage intensity of heating by fuel type
for census regions and states. Physical household characteristics such as the average
48To derive HDDs, for example, the difference between daily high and low temperatures is compared
to the threshold of 65 ◦F and summed over all days of a month. The respective data are furthermore
standardized to 1000.
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number of rooms per household, the average number of electric ovens, and the av-
erage floor space available per household are additionally gathered on a state level.
Data on the share of household members with a high-school diploma or higher as
well as the average number of ‘elderly’ people living in each state are taken from
RECS as well. Finally, as we expect macro-economic indicators to be relevant when
explaining the development of electricity consumption over time, we include data
on the unemployment level and adjusted gross domestic product. Hereby, we also
control for the impact of the Great Recession. Both indicators are taken from the
BLS. In addition, Table 4.3 shows descriptive statistics for all variables used for our
empirical estimations under Section 4.6.2.
4.6 Empirical Analysis
Following the identification strategy from Section 4.3, we use a two-stage empirical
approach. First, we derive a control group by applying synthetic control methods.49
In a second step, we conduct a Difference-in-Differences estimation to quantify the
effect under analysis.
4.6.1 Derivation of the Control Group Using Synthetic Controls
States are rather heterogeneous. This implies that characteristics driving residential
electricity consumption exhibit significant regional variation. Above all, these char-
acteristics include climatic conditions such as temperature and humidity, housing,
and social characteristics as well as demographic aspects. Consequently, it is ques-
tionable whether a single US state adequately resembles Californian characteristics
with respect to residential electricity consumption. In order to circumvent such hin-
drances, we apply synthetic control methods and derive a weighted combination of
US states that we use as the control group, ‘Synthetic California’. The application
of synthetic control methods is positioned in the context of a vast body of exist-
ing literature that gives further insights into methodological details (e.g. Abadie &
Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie et al. (2010), and Abadie et al. (2015)). The individual
weights for the synthetic counterfactual are determined according to the objective
function expressed by Formula 4.2.
min
w
(X1 − X0 ·w)′V (X1 − X0 ·w) (4.2)
49The respective procedure is described in detail in Section 4.6.1.
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Table 4.2: List of variables and references
Label Explanation Resolution Region Measure Ref(2016)
AM Im,s Share of households
with AMI
Yearly State-
specific
% EIA
C DDm,s,
HDDm,s
Cooling degree days,
Heating degree days
Monthly State-
specific
1000◦F NOAA
Clothesdr yerm,s Avg. share of electric
clothesdryers
’01,’05,’09 Census
regions
Relative
share
RECS
Customersresm,s Total residential
customer counts
Monthly State-
specific
Total EIA
Demand res,bil ledm,s Avg. electricity sales per
household
Monthly State-
specific
MWh EIA
Educationm,s Share of household
members with a high
school degree or higher
’01,’05,’09,
’11,’13
Census
regions
Relative
share
RECS
Elderl yPeoplem,s Avg. number of old
people living in a
household
’01,’05,’09,
’11,’13
Census
regions
Total RECS
Feed backPVm,s Total residential
feed-back (grid) from
PV
Monthly State-
specific
MWh EIA
F loorspacem,s Avg. floorspace per
household
’01,’05,09 Census
regions
m2 RECS
GDPm,s Total real GPD per
employee
Yearly State-
specific
mil.
USD
BLS
Heating
Equipmentm,s
Share of households
using electric heating
’01,’05,’09 Census
regions
Percent RECS
I r radiat ionm,s Avg. (1998-2009)
solar irradiation
Monthly State-
specific
kWh/
m2/da y
NREL
MainHeatingm,s Share of households
with electricity as
main heating fuel
’01,’05,’09 Census
regions
Relative
share
RECS
Ovenm,s Avg. number of
electric ovens per
household
’01,’05,’09 Census
regions
Total RECS
Priceresm,s Avg. electricity price
for residential
customers
Monthly State-
specific
Euro/
kWh
EIA
Re f ri geratorsm,s Avg. number of
refrigerators per
household
’01,’05,’09 Census
regions
Total RECS
Roomsm,s Avg. number of
rooms per household
’01,’05,’09 Census
regions
Total RECS
Unemplo ymentm,s Unemployment level Yearly State-
specific
Relative
share
RECS
Wagem,s Avg. weekly wage Monthly State-
specific
1000
USD
BLS
Notes to Table 4.2: Census regions include 9 regions and 4 states (CA, NY, FL, TX) if not otherwise
stated. The exact references are: NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2016),
RECS (Energy Information Administration, 2016a), EIA (Energy Information Administration, 2016b),
BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016), NREL (National Renewables Energy Laboratory, 2016).
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean SD Min 25% Median 75% Max
C DDm,s 2352 0.07 0.10 0.0 0.0 0.003 0.10 0.58
Clothesdr yerm,s 2352 0.77 0.14 0.47 0.54 0.84 0.90 0.97
Demand res,ad jm,s 2352 0.81 0.27 0.41 0.60 0.73 0.95 1.97
Educationm,s 2352 0.59 0.03 0.54 0.56 0.59 0.62 0.64
Elderl ypeoplem,s 2352 0.33 0.03 0.28 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.37
F loorspacem,s 2352 2049 250 1568 1895 2080 2289 2405
GDPm,s 2352 0.006 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.009
HDDm,s 2352 0.47 0.42 0.00 0.06 0.38 0.80 1.92
HeatingEquipmentm,s 2352 0.25 0.17 .06 0.13 0.23 0.29 0.65
MainHeatingm,s 2352 0.22 0.16 0.06 0.09 0.18 0.24 0.62
Ovenm,s 2352 1.02 .02 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.03 1.09
Priceresm,s 2352 0.111 0.038 0.048 0.082 0.100 0.141 0.241
Re f ri geratorsm,s 2352 1.24 0.05 1.14 1.20 1.23 1.28 1.30
Roomsm,s 2352 5.81 .32 5.19 5.65 5.93 6.13 6.21
Unemplo ymentm,s 2352 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.12
Wagem,s 2352 0.85 0.18 0.52 0.52 0.80 0.96 1.46
AM Im,s 2352 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99
Here w denotes a vector with weights for each state that has yet to be derived. The
individual weights sum up to one. In order to optimize these weights, we rely on
a procedure that minimizes the distance vector between Californian pre-treatment
characteristics (X1) and the respective characteristics of the resulting control group
(X0w). These characteristics include all variables that are depicted in Section 4.5.
We divide the pre-treatment period into two sub-periods. In more detail, we consider
a first pre-treatment period (1) that starts in 2002 and ends in 2005. Based on this
first period, we calculate the weights for the synthetic control group according to
the above mentioned methodology. Additionally, we define a second pre-treatment
period beginning when the Energy Action Plan in California was adopted (2006) and
continuing until the beginning of the treatment period in 2009 (see Figure 4.5). The
second pre-treatment period allows the assumption of parallel trends to be tested.
With regard to the data, the varying temporal resolution does not distort the
derivation of a synthetic control group since the respective methodology is based
on averages over time. More precisely, neglecting temporal variability, the chosen
approach aims to determine weights such that average values of the explanatory
variables during the first pre-treatment periods are resembled. We then account
for the relative importance of the individual explanatory variables X by introducing
a weight vector V . Following standard synthetic control methods (e.g., Abadie &
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Gardeazabal, 2003), we rely on a regression-based technique in order to derive V .50
Naturally, the set of time periods for determining V is also restricted to the first set
of pre-treatment periods.
The set of states that are considered to be control group candidates is restricted.
Suitable candidate states should exhibit no significant impact of AMI during the
entire period of observation. Thus, we use a subset of states with a smart meter
penetration lower than 10% as possible control group candidates. The respective
threshold exactly matches the definition of our treatment as we consider the treat-
ment period beginning in the first year with a Californian share of AMI higher than
10%. The remaining candidate states are depicted in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Candidate states with low AMI penetration
As a result, we obtain Synthetic California, which combines the states of New
York and New Mexico, which are given weights of 62.5 and 37.5% respectively. A
deeper analysis of the underlying causal relations reveals that New York adequately
resembles Californian housing characteristics, whereas New Mexico is particularly
characterized by similar climate conditions.
We now reduce our initial dataset by considering just the two sections, California
and Synthetic California. The variables for Synthetic California are calculated as
the weighted combination X0w. The resulting development of residential electricity
consumption is depicted in Figure 4.5(i), where we highlight the three periods that
we differentiate. For illustration purposes, Figure 4.5(ii) depicts the respective dif-
ference plot. In order to support the claim of a suitable control group, it is crucial
50Details on weights are listed in Section 4.8.4.
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that the pattern of residential electricity consumption in Synthetic California before
the treatment resembles the respective real Californian one. We therefore compare
the differences in residential electricity consumption between the two sections in
both pre-treatment periods. In general, the consumption pattern in the upper figure
is characterized by seasonal trends. More precisely, the development of residential
electricity consumption exhibits recurrent upwards and downwards movements in a
range between 430 and 830 kWh/month. The figures show that the seasonal com-
ponent, in particular, is reproduced accurately. As regards the differences in levels,
the respective values in California and Synthetic California differ only slightly be-
tween the two pre-treatment periods. In more detail, whereas the residential elec-
tricity consumption in the first pre-treatment period is 11 kWh lower on average
in California compared to Synthetic California, the respective average difference is
-15 kWh in the second pre-treatment period. Even though there is no perfect pre-
treatment match in both periods, the respective difference is rather constant until
the treatment period. Additionally, the average difference in residential electricity
consumption amounts to -36 kWh in the post treatment periods, which already indi-
cates a significant treatment effect. We therefore assume that residential electricity
consumption would have developed identically in California and Synthetic Califor-
nia if there had not been any additional treatment. Simply put, the assumption of
parallel trends is valid. We now focus on the development of residential electric-
ity consumption after the treatment. Essentially beginning in 2010, we observe a
clear excess of negative differences, indicating a significant impact of AMI on elec-
tricity consumption. Furthermore, the absolute value of peak differences is doubled
compared to the pre-treatment periods. To sum up, our descriptive results already
indicate a negative influence of smart meters on residential electricity consumption.
However, we address the question of causality and quantify the impact under anal-
ysis within the next section.
4.6.2 Difference-in-Differences Estimation Results
We define the yearly share of AMI as the treatment variable and thereby account
for the respective deployment process. In more detail, there is a time lag between
the decision for the smart-meter deployment and the ability of every household to
use AMI which is directly reflected by the treatment variable. We apply a linear
Difference-in-Differences estimation in levels according to Formula 4.3. We aim to
estimate the coefficient γ to shed light on whether or not a significant decrease of res-
idential electricity consumption due to smart-meter deployment has been achieved.
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(i) Synthetic controls: Descriptive comparison
(ii) Synthetic controls: Difference plot
Figure 4.5: Descriptive comparison and differences between the development of residential
electricity consumption in California and ‘Synthetic California’
72
4.6 Empirical Analysis
For our estimation, we rely on monthly data gathered over 14 consecutive years
(2002-2015). According to the estimation approach, we directly use the differences
between the respective values for California and Synthetic California.51 Besides the
treatment variable, we control for other potential impacting factors. We use the
subset of variables that provide monthly observations, because data with a tempo-
ral variability different from that exhibited by the dependent variable would lead
to distorted results and issues of collinearity. First, we include monthly average
electricity prices (Priceresm ). Furthermore, we consider data for HDDm and C DDm
to account for weather conditions. Finally, we account for macro-economic impact
factors comprising wage data (Wagem) and the development of the unemployment
level (Unemplo ymentl vlm). In addition to the explanatory variables, we estimate
the error term µm using robust standard errors to account for heteroscedasticity. It
is worth mentioning that we do not estimate an aggregate constant term but control
for different periods.
∆Demand res,ad jm = α1DummyPre−Treatment1 +α2DummyPre−Treatment2
+ γ∆AM Im
+ β1∆Price
res
m
+ β2∆C DDm + β3∆HDDm
+ β4∆Unemplo ymentl vlm + β5∆Wagem
+µm
(4.3)
We conduct a two-stage least squares regression analysis to address issues related
to endogeneity of electricity prices. In more detail, one may expect simultaneity of
residential electricity consumption and the respective prices due to mutual bidirec-
tional dependencies. We therefore use the lagged electricity price as an instrument52
for the original explanatory variable. We argue that the electricity prices from past
months affect the current prices (cov[Priceresm−1, Priceresm ] 6= 0) since, for example,
fixed price components do not change on a monthly basis. We identify a high first-
order autocorrelation of 96% in California and 76% in Synthetic California.53 At the
same time, we do not expect the electricity price from the previous month to impact
the current electricity consumption as it does not reflect the price that households
51We provide an overview of the respective descriptive statistics in Section 4.8.3.
52A Kleiberger-Paap test indicates that the hypothesis of weak instruments may be rejected.
53Lower values compared to California may be traced back to the use of a weighted combination of
electricity prices.
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are actually charged. Thus, there should be no direct impact on the decision ra-
tionale of households other than through its impact on the current electricity price
and thus we assume that the exclusion restriction is valid (cov[Priceresm−1,µ] = 0).
As well as the electricity price, it is relevant to comment on the other explanatory
variables included. By default, weather conditions are a factor given exogenously
and the economic variables such as wage data are most commonly assumed to have
a unidirectional impact on electricity consumption as well. Moreover, we do not
expect our estimation to be biased by omitted variables, since we include the most
relevant variables that, according to prior literature, are assumed to have an impact
on residential electricity consumption. Finally, we isolated the impact of AMI such
that we do not expect any other policy measures to influence the artificial electricity
consumption we use.
To investigate the impact of the treatment in question and to break down the re-
spective temporal development, we depict estimates for three specifications, namely
IV (1), IV (2), and IV (3). Put simply, IV (1) measures the aggregate impact of de-
ploying AMI in California on the state-wide residential electricity consumption. Re-
sults for IV (1) are displayed in Table 4.4, where we find the treatment effect to be
significant at the 1% level. A 100% diffusion rate of AMI triggers an average monthly
residential electricity reduction of 31 kWh per household, which is equivalent to a
relative reduction of 5.1%. These estimation results provide the first evidence of
causality and both estimates which are controlling for significant differences in the
pre-treatment periods are insignificant. However, additional insights and further ev-
idence for causality are provided in Section 4.8.6. Thus, we claim that there is no
systematic difference between the Californian and the Synthetic Californian devel-
opment of residential electricity consumption other than that induced through the
AMI.
All in all, the p-value of the model suggests significance. With regard to the addi-
tional explanatory variables included, both C DD and HDD reveal highly significant
coefficients, and reduced regressions show that they constitute the major share of
explanatory power. This is plausible as both variables reflect the need for electric-
ity through, for example, air conditioning in non-heating periods and heating in
colder months. In addition, we see a slightly significant negative impact of the un-
employment level. An increasing unemployment rate tends to be accompanied by
decreasing wages, which reduces the available budget for the electricity bill. Finally,
we observe a negative coefficient for the electricity price, as increasing prices are
expected to create incentives for reducing electricity consumption. However, the
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Table 4.4: IV Estimates for DiD estimation
Dependent variable: ∆Demand res,ad jm
Explanatory variable IV (1) IV (2) IV (3)
Pre-Treatment1 -0.07 -0.002 -0.003
(0.007) 0.007) 0.007)
Pre-Treatment2 -0.10 -0.006 -0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Non-heating Heating
∆Share AM Itotal,m -0.031
∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Non-heating Heating
∆Share AM I2009−2011,m -0.020 0.024
(0.025) (0.02)
Non-heating Heating
∆Share AM I2012−2014,m -0.041∗∗∗ -0.008
(0.013) (0.016)
Non-heating Heating
∆Share AM I2015,m -0.039
∗∗ -0.031
(0.016) (0.022)
∆Priceelec,resm -0.46 -0.48 -0.36
(0.51) (0.49) (0.57)
∆C DDm 0.66
∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.081)
∆HDDm 0.04
∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
∆Unemplo ymentl vlm -0.53
∗ -0.46 -0.88∗∗
(0.20) (0.24) (0.36)
∆Wagem 0.05 0.04 (0.07)
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
observations 167 167 167
R2 0.45 0.47 0.48
F 23.8 22.91 17.17
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes to Table 4.4: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ / ∗∗ / ∗∗∗ : significant at the 0.05 /0.02 /
0.01 error level respectively. We use data from January 2002 until December 2015.
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respective estimate is insignificant, which may be traced back to the data availabil-
ity. Furthermore, we do not directly use the electricity prices that households are
actually charged; instead we use averages across all tariff periods and service areas.
In addition to IV (1), we specify IV (2) in order to investigate seasonal variations
of the treatment effect under analysis. We differentiate between heating and non-
heating periods, all of which are defined within the same year. We define heating
periods to cover the months from January to March and from October to December.
We observe a significant impact of AMI in non-heating periods, whereas there is no
significant influence in colder months. The respective reduction in non-heating pe-
riods amounts to 42 kWh per household per month (6.7%). We expect some devices
to be more likely to be substitutable in summer periods (such as air conditioning,
dryers etc.), whereas electric heating in the heating period is a more basic need. As
one main finding, we thus conclude that the potential for energy conservation can
basically be leveraged by households in non-heating periods. At the same time, the
average residential electricity consumption in the states under consideration tends
to be higher in the non-heating periods. Thus, policy makers may achieve a slight
reduction of the electricity consumption in peak months by deploying AMI. Such a
finding is especially important in the light of the Californian energy crisis, which was
the event triggering the deployment of smart meters. However, we are well aware
that we do not control for the one-time peak load but focus on the overall electricity
consumption.
In addition to IV (2), we specify IV (3) in order to analyze the temporal structure
of the impact of smart meters on residential electricity consumption and to address
the question of continuous effects. More precisely, we split up the post-treatment
periods into three sub-periods and differentiate between heating and non-heating
periods. Overall, we get similar results with respect to the influence of the climate
factors C DD and HDD. Furthermore, the macroeconomic indicator is now signif-
icant at the 2% level and the respective estimate is slightly higher than in IV (1).
As regards the treatment effect, we identify additional evidence for seasonality. The
impact of AMI on residential electricity consumption is significant in non-heating
periods only. Analyzing differences between the non-heating periods in all three
post-treatment periods, we first find that the impact of AMI is insignificant in the
first post-treatment period. We argue that this finding may be traced back to the
introductory phase of deploying smart meters. In the first period, there are no ob-
servations available that reflect a state in which all households are able to access
AMI. The aggregate effect in which we are interested may thus be derived instead
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from the last two post-treatment periods with AMI being fully deployed. From 2012
to 2015, we observe a relative reduction of residential electricity consumption that
ranges from 6.1% to 6.4%. Compared to the literature, this is a little lower than the
reductions gained from field experiments, as mentioned in Section 4.2. In addition,
we find that this reduction potential related to AMI is rather continuous over time.
We find no evidence that the impact under analysis comes to an abrupt end after
some years. However, it may be worth considering an extended period of observa-
tion in future research. Finally, the temporal structure identified supports the hy-
pothesis of causality. One may, in particular, assume that the methodology to isolate
the impact of AMI from energy efficiency savings is imprecise. However, if that were
the case, we would expect significant differences in electricity consumption before
the deployment of smart meters was completed, as rather constant energy-efficiency
savings were achieved from 2007 onwards (see Figure 4.7 in the Appendix). Rather
to the contrary, we identify coefficients that strongly comply with the temporal de-
velopment of the share of AMI.
4.7 Conclusion
One topic worth stressing in the light of climate targets and emission reduction goals
focuses on energy conservation. Within the residential sector, the design of energy-
saving programs has to account for unique behavioral aspects such as limited infor-
mation and bounded rationality. Against this backdrop, we investigate how AMI is
impacting on residential electricity consumption at the state level over time. Our
identification strategy is based on a decision for statewide smart-meter deployment
by the government of the state of California in 2005. As such, the treatment on
which we are focusing is policy-driven and not based on a natural experiment or
pilot program as predominantly studied in prior research. We are thus able to cir-
cumvent hindrances stemming from a lack of generality or Hawthorne effects. We
aim at assessing the overall effectiveness of policy measures related to energy con-
servation. To the best of our knowledge, such a framework has not been studied so
far.
We apply a two-stage empirical approach. First, we derive a control group as a
weighted combination of US states using synthetic control methods. We find a com-
bination of New York and New Mexico that reproduces the characteristics of Califor-
nia appropriately. We then descriptively depict the development of residential elec-
tricity consumption in California and its counterfactual, ‘Synthetic California’, and
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find an indication for a change in consumption after 2009 when introducing smart
meters. In order to draw inferences regarding causality and significance, we apply a
Difference-in-Differences estimation in a second step. Our results comprise two ma-
jor findings, all of which contribute to the existing literature on energy conservation.
First, we observe a significant reduction in electricity consumption induced through
AMI in non-heating periods that essentially ranges from 6.1 to 6.4%. In contrast,
there is no significant reduction in heating periods. Thereby we infer that reduc-
tions in electricity consumption induced by smart-meter deployment are linked to
seasonality. Second, based on our empirical results, we find an indication that the
impact of additional informational feedback on residential electricity consumption is
continuous during the period analyzed. However, we are not able to draw a unique
conclusion on persistence due to a lack of further periods of observation.
Summarizing our findings, we suggest that the Californian smart-meter deploy-
ment is effective in leveraging energy-saving potentials. We expect this finding to
be mainly attributable to the additional informational feedback that smart meters
provide. In essence, this information may be the cornerstone for altering consump-
tion decisions that have been taken previously. Theory suggests that breaking the
rationality boundaries improves decisions with respect to electricity savings. We
find an indication that the impact of smart meters on consumption is continuous.
However, for service utilities it may be worth implementing monitoring procedures
in order to assess the long-term impact of smart meters. Furthermore, it may be
worth considering supplementary informational feedback such as programs that fo-
cus on social comparisons. Finally, we find that the influence of AMI exhibits strong
seasonal variations. Thus, it may be beneficial to consider complementary energy-
saving measures.
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4.8 Appendix
4.8.1 The General Functioning of the Advanced Metering Infrastructure
Figure 4.6 shows the simplified functioning of the AMI. As depicted, the AMI first
enables the collection of consumption data differentiated by energy source. The con-
sumption data are collected by a smart meter device that then processes and trans-
mits the data via an electronic network to the end user. As such, the AMI could pro-
vide real-time consumption data with electricity price information, allowing users
to curb electricity consumption if electricity prices are increasing. As information
flows iteratively between the meter and the end user, we stress that such a system is
a closed informational system allowing (potentially) for correction of consumption
in a continuous manner (see ‘inductive process’ from Section 4.2).
Figure 4.6: Simplified illustration of Advanced Meter Infrastructure (AMI) and its informa-
tional feedback
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4.8.2 Development of Energy-Efficiency Savings in California
Figure 4.7: Development of energy-efficiency savings in California over time
Depicting the development of energy-efficiency saving estimates for California in
Figure 4.7, we identify a significant and rather continuous impact of energy-saving
measures beginning in 2007.
4.8.3 Descriptive Statistics: Difference-in-Differences Variables
Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics: Differences in levels (California minus Synthetic California)
Variable N Mean SD Min 25% Median 75% Max
∆C DDm 168 0.01 0.05 -0.12 0.00 0.005 0.002 0.18
∆Demand res,ad jm 168 -0.02 0.05 -0.20 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.11
∆HDDm 168 -0.22 0.22 -0.83 -0.41 -0.18 -0.01 0.09
∆Priceresm 168 0.005 0.015 -0.079 -0.003 0.006 0.014 0.039
∆Unemplo ymentm 168 0.016 0.012 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.027 0.04
∆Wagem 168 0.03 0.05 -0.14 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.10
∆AM Im 168 0.393 0.444 0.000 0.000 0.131 0.954 0.997
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4.8.4 Empirical Results: Weight Vector V for the Exogenous Variables
The weight vector V is presented in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: Weights of the exogenous variables
Label Weight
C DDm,s 0.109
Clothesdr yerm,s 0.091
Educationm,s 0.008
Elderl ypeoplem,s 0.010
F loorspacem,s 0.071
GDPm,s 0.119
HDDm,s 0.263
HeatingEquipmentm,s 0.090
MainHeatingm,s 0.040
Ovenm,s 0.000
Priceresm,s 0.042
Re f ri geratorsm,s 0.009
Roomsm,s 0.083
Unemplo ymentm,s 0.000
Wagem,s 0.149
4.8.5 PV Self-Consumption
In general, we calculate the quantity of self-consumed electricity generation as the
difference between the total electricity generation by PV systems and the amount
that is fed back into the grid. Monthly data with respect to the total electricity gen-
eration from renewable energy plants in the residential sector that is fed back into
the grid are provided by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) (Energy
Information Administration, 2016b). Furthermore, the EIA provides data on the to-
tal capacity of PV systems installed on a residential level. However, there are no
publicly available monthly data on the total PV electricity generation in households.
This is due to the concept of net metering. Thus, we use a heuristic approach in order
to derive PV electricity generation data. More precisely, our approach is based on the
monthly average global horizontal irradiance, which is given in kWhm2d for each state
by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (National Renewables Energy Labora-
tory, 2016). The respective averages were derived from observations between 1998
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and 2009 and do not vary across the years during our period of observation. We as-
sume a typical efficiency of 13.2% for PV systems and a power density of 9m2/kW p.
For illustration purposes, our calculation methodology is expressed in Equation 4.4.
Sel f Consumptionres,PVm,s = Instal ledCapaci t y
res,PV
m,s · I r radiat ionGHIm,s
· Da ysmonth · E f f icienc y PV · AreakW p
− FeedBackres,PVm,s
(4.4)
4.8.6 Difference-in-Differences Estimation: Additional Evidence for
Causality
By controlling for differences in electricity consumption apart from those related to
AMI, we provide additional evidence for causality. In more detail, we include yearly
time dummies in addition to the share of AMI to control for other impacting factors.
All the respective time dummies yield insignificant coefficients as depicted in Table
4.7. One may claim, therefore, that we identify no impact on residential electricity
consumption other than that induced through the deployment of smart meters.
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Table 4.7: IV Estimates for DiD estimation when controlling for yearly time dummies
Dependent variable: ∆Demand res,ad jm
Explanatory variable IV (1)
2003 -0.003
(0.008)
2004 -0.009
(0.009)
2005 0.009
(0.021)
2006 0.011
(0.011)
2007 -0.006
(0.01)
2008 0.022
(0.028)
2009 0.049
(0.034)
2010 0.056
(0.050)
2011 0.078
(0.052)
2012 0.041
(0.037)
2013 0.035
(0.029)
2014 0.002
(0.034)
∆Share AM Itotal,m -0.035
∗∗∗
(0.015)
∆Priceelec,resm -0.42
(1.08)
∆C DDm 0.70
∗∗∗
(0.09)
∆HDDm 0.03
∗∗∗
(0.02)
∆Unemplo ymentl vlm -0.22
(0.13)
∆Wagem 0.07
(0.06)
observations 167
R2 0.45
F 23.8
p-value 0.00
Notes to Table 4.7: Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. ∗ / ∗∗ / ∗∗∗ : significant at the 0.05 /0.02 /
0.01 error level respectively. We use data from Jan-
uary 2002 until December 2015.
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4.8.7 Simplified Residential Schedules
Residential schedules from PG&E and SCE, as shown in Figure 4.8, may not fully
reflect the wide range of tariff designs provided by the IOUs. As one example, we
do not consider schedules from the CARE program where customers are eligible
for reduced tariffs. Moreover, rate structures may be subject to changes over time.
Our data were collected in the first quarter of 2016. However, the samples below
illustrate tier and time-of-use schedules in a simplified way.
Figure 4.8: Simplified schedules for tier and time-of-use in the residential sector
Generally, tiers may be subject to change in terms of numbers, territory, and pricing
as well. Significant differences in the tariff structure for time-of-use schedules stem
from the definitions of peak and off-peak. In the above example, PG&E defines peak
hours as ranging from 12 am to 6 pm, whereas all other hours are declared off-peak.
For SCE, peak hours are defined as ranging from 2 pm to 8 pm. The off-peak period
begins at 8 am and lasts until 2 pm. Additionally, the period from 8 pm to 10 pm is
considered as off-peak. The ‘super off-peak’ period comprises the hours between 10
pm and 8 am, while peak is replaced by off-peak at weekends.
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5 Electricity Reduction in the Residential Sector -
The Example of the Californian Energy Crisis
Leveraging conservation potential within the residential sector is one important topic
for countries aiming to save electricity. In this article, I study the conservation pro-
grams that were initiated in order to counteract electricity blackouts within the Cal-
ifornian Energy Crisis. By applying synthetic control techniques I first identify the
overall electricity reduction for the residential sector. The effectiveness of conserva-
tion programs taken to leverage electricity reduction potential is then estimated with
a treatment regression. I find that a reduction is jointly achieved by the mass me-
dia campaign and ‘20/20’ rebate program resulting in quarterly reductions between
6% to 12%. I furthermore argue that despite the possibility of replacing electrical
household equipment, some residential consumers must have been able to change
consumption habits to uncover the majority of this potential.
5.1 Introduction
Efforts to encourage reductions in residential electricity consumption have a long
history in the State of California. The starting point for an analysis of mechanisms
targeting reductions has been the Energy Crisis when severe supply shortages caused
electricity outages during the year 2000. As a consequence, the academic debate
about the consumer’s willingness and capability to reduce electricity consumption
over short time horizons has been raised during the crisis and beyond. In a broader
context the debate focuses today on identification strategies of potentially available
electricity reductions and find ways to effectively leverage them.
In the residential sector, energy economic related research primarily considers
electricity price-driven mechanisms, both theoretically and empirically, arguing that
stronger electricity price signals reaching the consumer might effectively reduce con-
sumption in ’stressed’ electricity market situations. In this context real time pricing
has been extensively discussed, however conclusive evidence on reduction effects
is lacking so far. Empirically, findings are often based on field experiments that fall
short of making general statements. By studying the unique events of the Energy Cri-
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sis, I contribute to the analysis of electricity prices impacts on an aggregated level
and complement prior research by studying the impact of two state-induced conser-
vation measures whose impact has so far only found minor attention and, to the best
of my knowledge, not been quantified so far. In the particular case of California, the
nationwide efforts to promote electricity savings through the mass media campaign
and ‘20/20’ rebate program mutually targeted a behavioral change for electricity us-
age as opposed to a monetary incentive program targeting a replacement of technical
household equipment. As such it implicitly raised the question if electricity reduc-
tions over short time spans can be realized through a change in electricity use by
encouraging residential consumers with monetary and non-monetary conservation
programs.
The article at hand empirically analyzes the effectiveness of the two conservation
programs jointly and covers a 48-month period that fits the events before and after
the Energy Crisis. Such an analysis needs to be unbiased of other (technical) energy
efficiency or other conservation programs than the ones analyzed, ruling out inter-
actions with other programs over the same period. My analysis methodically makes
use of constructing a synthetic control group leading me to the structural compari-
son of the residential consumption in the treatment (California) and control group
state (‘Synthetic Energy Crisis California’). The differences in residential electricity
consumption allow to comment on an overall residential consumption reduction and
have not been quantified so far. I then measure and evaluate the different sources
impacting residential electricity reduction with a treatment regression.
I find that a reduction of residential electricity consumption in California ranges
between 6% to 12% depending on the quarter of the respective post crisis year.
Over the years 2001 and 2002 the quarterly reductions timely coincide with the
mass media campaign and the ‘20/20’ rebate program. By controlling for the influ-
ence of weather, economic indicators and the residential electricity price, my treat-
ment regression results show overall higher residential electricity reductions from
the conservation programs in 2001 compared to 2002 which I relate to the fade-out
of the mass media campaign in 2002. Furthermore, residential electricity reduction
occurred more strongly over the summer months compared to winter months pro-
viding some evidence that consumers willingness to give up a certain comfort level
in winter is restricted. In total, the initially targeted 20% of electricity reduction for
the residential sector has never been reached, neither by the ‘20/20’ rebate program
nor by the joint impact of the mass media conservation campaign and the ‘20/20’
rebate program.
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Overall, I conclude that the measured electricity reductions have been strongly
supported by the ‘20/20’ rebate program and the mass media campaign. The ef-
fectiveness of the two conservation programs has been enhanced by the design of
each program. In particular, the mass media campaign and the rebate programs con-
veyed a clear and easy to understand message to the residential consumer facilitating
information processing for the consumer as for instance compared to complex pric-
ing schemes (Ito, 2014). My findings make a valuable contribution to the debates
around electricity conservation programs and their effectiveness while accounting
for the impact of residential electricity prices on consumption. Since residential
electricity reductions based on the programs occurred, a portion of residential con-
sumers must have been able to change certain habits that reduced electricity usage
and thus uncovered electricity saving potential. At the same time it is reasonable
to assume that no major change in household equipment stock occurred. I argue
that this stems from the unique events of the crisis, the short time span and the non-
existence of other fierce reduction programs targeting a replacement of household
equipment.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides a litera-
ture background for the Energy Crisis from an economic and regulatory perspective
and discusses electricity price impacts on residential electricity consumption. Sec-
tion 5.3 discusses the conservation programs for the Californian market in detail. A
data description is presented in Section 5.4 and Section 5.5 shows the used estima-
tion approaches and discusses the estimation results. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Literature
Literature surrounding the Californian Energy Crisis is divided into analyses attempt-
ing to understand the economic and regulatory factors leading to the Energy Crisis,
the conservation programs taken to contain the Energy Crisis and demand responses
in the Californian energy market. Furthermore, regulatory suggestions to prevent
further crises are made.
Causes for the crisis in California have been analyzed in different articles. Eco-
nomic and regulatory factors triggering the crisis are extensively studied by Woo
(2001), Stenglein (2002), Blumstein et al. (2002) and Weare (2003), who all em-
phasize that such factors included a shortage of generating capacity while electricity
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demand sustained54, bottlenecks in related (gas) markets, faulty market design and
potential market power abuse. Whereas all of the above articles describe the root
causes for the Energy Crisis in detail, Wolak (2003) and Borenstein (2002) stress
regulatory-driven mitigation strategies that could prevent such crisis. In particular,
Wolak (2003) argues that instant regulatory intervention is crucial to correct sup-
ply break downs in flawed markets and conservation programs have to be quickly
implemented if a meaningful distressing effect on the energy balance is desired. In
contrast to this rather short term focus of Wolak’s article, Borenstein (2002) stresses
that long term contracts between buyers and sellers in electricity markets may gener-
ally stabilize the market and thus provide a certain security of supply in the long run.
Joskow (2001) adds to those factors the analysis of power procurement initiatives
helping to stabilize in his view the energy market.
Besides the causes for the crisis, the effect of demand responses due to electric-
ity prices in the Californian electricity market has been studied as well. The pre-
dominant motivation for that is that demand response programs target to relieve
the demand side thereby triggering bill savings, contributing to a reliable electric-
ity system through reduced outages and reducing potential market power. Albadi
& El-Saadany (2008) provide a comprehensive summary of demand response op-
tions for electricity markets, distinguishing between incentive and price based pro-
grams. As opposed to direct load control programs, the latter contain electricity
price based demand responses such as peak and off-peak, time-of-use and real time
pricing that have strongly been discussed in the context of the Energy Crisis since
their individual contributions remain debated. Herter et al. (2007), for instance, ar-
gue that peak pricing results in demand reductions, however the results are based on
a rather small field experiment making an assertion claiming generality in a larger
framework questionable. Borenstein (2002) stresses that a real time pricing scheme
might stimulate instant demand and supply reactions, thereby benefiting the func-
tioning of the market as a whole. However, his theoretical thoughts require from the
residential consumer the processing of all information resulting from a non-linear
pricing scheme, an argument that Ito (2014) takes up in his work. Contrary to the
literature streams on demand-reducing impacts of real-time pricing, Ito (2014) ar-
gues that consumers faced with complex non-linear pricing schemes are not able
to draw right conclusion from such complex schemes. As such he concludes that,
if at all, consumer react to average rather than marginal prices, making non-linear
54The authors consistently argue these shortages are linked to the low hydro reservoirs during the
Energy Crisis, the 16GW capacity revisions made at the end of the summer 2000, and the lack of
investments into new capacity prior to the crisis.
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pricing schemes in terms of electricity conservation useless. By studying the residen-
tial electricity consumption reduction in the San Diego’s service area, Reiss & White
(2003) argue that besides the price impacts consumers reacted to the broadcasted
mass media campaign more than initially expected thereby extending price based
arguments made in conjunction with residential electricity reduction.
It is worth stressing that during the Energy Crisis residential customers in Cali-
fornia were charged for electricity usage based on two-tiered tariffs distinguishing
between consumers using a static baseline consumption volume or a high volume.
When faced with two-tiered tariffs, it remains questionable to argue that residen-
tial consumers reacted to the price changes, since neither a price signal is provided
to the residential consumers, nor did consumers sign contracts reflecting instanta-
neous electricity price changes. Additionally, wholesale price increases were not
fully passed on to the residential consumer during the Energy Crisis (Wolak, 2003).
Furthermore, doubts on consumers willingness and ability to filter out the price ef-
fect amid all other sources impacting demand (i.e. weather) raises further doubts
on the consumer’s responsiveness to residential electricity prices. To sum up, evi-
dence on factors such as electricity prices remains ambiguous and an analysis of the
root causes for demand reduction during the Energy Crisis needs to incorporate all
demand variation sources.
In my article, I therefore first determine the overall residential electricity reduc-
tions, which may be more broadly interpreted as reduction potential.55 Surprisingly,
this first step is so far lacking in the literature and provides a baseline against which
all demand reducing efforts regardless of their origins can be assessed. Secondly, any
electricity price effects resulting from price movements are taken into my analysis
allowing me to comment on a electricity price-driven impact on residential consump-
tion. Thirdly, by focusing on the effects of two residential conservation programs,
I evaluate their consumption reducing effect for the residential sector through a
treatment estimation. The two investigated residential conservation programs are
unbiased of other efficiency programs and have so far found only minor attention in
the literature which is partly due to the challenges that need to be overcome when
constructing suitable control groups on a national level. Contrary to the issue of a
potentially ‘modest’ price signal within the residential sector, the analyzed conserva-
tion programs provided a clear and simple consumption-reducing message directly
addressing the consumer.
55A reduction potential describes an amount of electricity reduction that can be (theoretically) realized
but might not be fully leveraged in reality due to, for instance, comfort issues and a consumer’s
sluggish adjustment with respect to secondary energy use.
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5.3 The Energy Crisis and its containment through
conservation programs
During the Californian Energy Crisis the Californian residents suffered from elec-
tricity outages not due to extreme weather conditions but rather low hydro reser-
voirs, and large undertaken capacity revisions during times when electricity demand
increased (Energy Information Administration, 2017) and wholesale power prices
spiked (CPEC, 2000). According to Weare (2003) electricity consumption increased
by about 3 percent between 1998 and 2000 in California and from 2000 to 2001
by 6 percent (Energy Information Administration, 2016b). The resulting imbalance
between an increased demand and unchanged generation capacity was also flagged
by the Californian Independent System Operator (CAISO) which, as a consequence,
in summer 2000 declared an emergency stage 1 alert for system security reasons.
As the events unfolded, the threat for outages continued and reached its peak
shortly thereafter in November 2000 when 16 gigawatts of the total generation ca-
pacity were taken out of the market by Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), Southern
California Edison (SCE) and San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E) due to servicing
(c.f. Blumstein et al. (2002)).56 The 16 GW reflected 35% of the total Californian
generation capacity. Although servicing has been rationalized based on heavy plant
running times during the summer 2000 by the three major investor-owned utili-
ties (IOUs), other arguments for offline plants have been discussed, such as Joskow
(2001) arguing that market manipulations may have played an important role.
Whatever the exact reasons have been, the threat for blackouts was severe and
state leaders decided to throw considerable resources into promoting electricity con-
servation programs targeting a reduction in electricity usage from 2001 on. The
undertaken conservation programs to contain the Californian Energy Crisis were ac-
companied by strong governmental policies (International Energy Agency, 2005).
Over half a billion dollars were allocated in the beginning by the Californian legisla-
ture to fund these conservation programs as a short-term policy action for electricity
conservation. One of those programs was a mass media campaign belonging to the
marketing campaign ‘Flex Your Power’ that was coordinated through the State of
California and the Consumer Services Agency (Todd & Wood, 2006). In January
2001 this conservation effort was signed and became active. It included voluntary
partnerships working on the reduction of electricity consumption, the distribution of
56The Figure 5.4 of the Appendix provides a monthly comparison for capacity revisions between 1999
and 2000 shortly before the conservation programs for containment of the Energy Crisis unfolded.
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informational material to consumers, the promotion of energy conservation lessons
and small events promoting the future use of Energy Star appliances. The ‘Flex Your
Power’ program however focused on the mass media broadcasts to promote a delib-
erate use of electricity during the Energy Crisis (Bender et al., 2002). The target of
the ’Flex Your Power’ campaign to reduce electricity consumption and peak demand
over summer periods was encouraged by a series of television, radio and newspaper
ads, as well as educational material. To induce a behavioral change in electricity
usage, the campaign concretely promoted shifting laundry and dish washing from
peak hours to off-peak hours, turning-off lights, unplugging equipment and adjusting
thermostats of electricity intense air conditions (Lutzenhiser, 1993). The ads used
were designed in a way to attract different target audiences defined by age, ethnicity
and language spoken. The campaign particularly targeted the summer of 2001 and
2002, however it didn’t come to a complete stop in other seasons. Except for two
off-air periods in April 2001 and March-April 2002, the mass media campaign was
conducted regularly until summer 2002 and with an initial frequency of 50 television
and radio ads per week from February through mid-September 2001. After Septem-
ber the frequency for television and radio spots decreased to 25 times per week in
2001. Full-page newspaper ads ran one time per week from May through July 2001.
For the rest of this first program year newspaper ads appeared every second week.
In parallel, the State of California launched a conservation rebate program in order
to further contain the crisis. The ‘20/20’ rebate program encouraged nationwide
consumers conservation behavior and rewarded consumers for electricity savings.
Therefore, the California Public Utility Commission (CPUC) passed on an executive
order to the three largest Californian investor-owned utilities (IOUs) and urged all
three to implement a rebate program. The program consisted of a 20% discount to
customers on their monthly bills in June, July, August and September 2001 and in
July, August, September and October 2002 respectively. Discounts were offered if the
customers consumed 20% less electricity compared to the same months in 2000.57
All customers who qualified participated automatically in this rebate program and
were credited for conservation efforts by the internal billing system of each utility.
Figure 5.1 shows the two conservation programs and their implementation peri-
ods. Whereas the mass media campaign for electricity reduction continued over a
longer time span, however with varying intensity, the ‘20/20’ conservation rebate
57SDG&E customers had to reduce their residential electricity consumption by 15% compared to 2000.
A residential sample bill accounting for conservation efforts under the ‘20/20’ program is shown
in Figure 5.3 of the Appendix.
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Figure 5.1: Californian residential electricity consumption and conservation programs
program targeted summer periods where residential electricity consumption was
historically at high levels. The average electricity consumption per household dis-
played in figure 5.1 depicts the respective residential electricity consumption before
the first signs the crisis in the summer of 2000 (Section 5.2). As such, Figure 5.1
also shows that the two state-induced conservation programs unfolded rapidly after
the supply shortage in November 2000.
5.4 Data
My empirical analysis is based on a 48-month period starting in January 1999. Vari-
ables contain information on residential electricity consumption over time and ac-
count for differences between the states. These differences are reflected over time
within the panel data set. Since some of the data used as explanatory variables dis-
play varying temporal and regional resolutions (see Table 5.1), I adjust the data in
such a way that it first fits the monthly temporal resolution and second that it re-
flects state-specific data thereby extending prior data work of Paschmann & Paulus
(2017). The adjustment is solely done for the household survey data obtained from
Energy Information Administration (2016a).
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5.4.1 Dependent Variable: Residential electricity consumption
I gather monthly residential electricity consumption data from the Energy Informa-
tion Administration (2016b) in order to analyze the impact of electricity conser-
vation programs within the context of the Energy Crisis. To measure conservation
program impacts on residential electricity consumption during the Energy Crisis,
other energy efficiency or conservation programs and their impacts on residential
electricity consumption need to be thoroughly accounted for. The reason for this
is that other programs might distort the impact of the analyzed conservation pro-
grams on residential electricity consumption. Fortunately, rigor programs targeting
electricity reduction through energy efficiency or conservation programs have been
implemented after and foremost as a consequence of the Energy Crisis leading to En-
ergy Action Plans in 2003 and 2005 (California Energy Commission, 2003, 2005).58
Energy efficiency and conservation programs for the residential sector before the
Energy Crisis were thus negligible despite early implementation attempts for net
metering in 2000 (CPUC, 2005).59 Due to the lack of energy efficiency and conser-
vation programs prior to the Energy Crisis, an adjustment of residential electricity
consumption data is not needed.
The data on residential electricity consumption itself consists of monthly (m) state-
specific (s) electricity sales in the residential sector including data for PG&E, SCE,
and SDG&E. Residential customer of all three IOUs account for the major share of all
Californian residential customers (> 72%) and residential electricity consumption
(> 74%) over the respective period. This guarantees no loss of representative nature
when assessing the impact of the analyzed conservation programs in the residential
sector. Monthly state-specific electricity sales are then divided by the respective num-
ber of customers in order to derive the average monthly electricity consumption per
household (Demand resm,s).
5.4.2 Explanatory Variables
Table 5.1 gives an overview of all variables used for the synthetic control group
derivation and the two stage treatment regression. Electricity consumption is de-
58Both Energy Action Plans considered programs that provided explicit incentives for demand reduc-
tion and energy efficiency investments, fostered dynamic pricing, and issued additional energy
conservation programs.
59Renewable capacity deployment with net metering was low, not reaching 25MW by 2005 for the res-
idential sector. It took until the roll out of smart metering devices to accurately program residential
fed-back electricity volumes.
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pendent on the respective season, triggering the usage of a series of devices or appli-
cations within the residential sector. Thus, cooling degree days (CDDs) and heating
degree days (HDDs) are calculated for all U.S. states from 1999 to 2002.60 The me-
teorological data stems from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA). Other explanatory variables such as residential electricity consumption,
sales, number of customers, and average electricity prices are taken from the U.S.
Energy Information Administration (EIA). Data on the employment level and wages
stem from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). All data from the EIA and the BLS is
provided on a monthly and state-specific level.
In order to explain relative differences of residential electricity consumption be-
tween the U.S. states, I furthermore rely on household survey data for each U.S. state.
The Residential Energy Consumption Survey (RECS) and the American Household
Survey (AHS) provide suitable sources in which data for electricity intense house-
holds equipment and appliances such as the average number of refrigerators or elec-
tric ovens per household are published. Additionally, the survey gathers data on
physical and demographic household characteristics such as for instance the average
number of rooms or floorspace per household or the share of household members
with a high school degree or higher as well as the average number of kids living in
each state and household. All variables and thus all details including sources and
temporal resolution are shown in Table 5.1. Raw data from RECS is converted into
monthly values assuming no change over time until the next reference point.61 For
the given 48-months period analyzed, I am able to make use of two reference points
in time. The data for these reference points stem from the national surveys in 2001
and 2005.
60To compute HDDs, all days showing differences between daily high and low temperatures above
65◦Df are summed up for the month and standardized to 1000.
61Despite the fact that monthly data is not available in RECS, such a data conversion is applicable
if monthly variation over time is assumed to be low, which may be the case for some variables
(i.e. average floor space). All descriptive statistics used for the empirical estimations are shown in
Table 5.3 of the Appendix.
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Table 5.1: List of variables and references
Label Explanation Resolution Region Measure Ref(2017)
C DDm,s
HDDm,s
Cooling degree days,
Heating degree days
Monthly State-
specific
Total NOAA
Clothesdr yerm,s Share of electric
clothesdryers
’01,’05 Census
regions
Relative
share
RECS
Demand resm,s Elec sales per household Monthly State-
specific
kWh EIA
F loorspacem,s Avg. floor space per
household
’01,’05 Census
regions
m2 RECS
GDPm,s Total real GDP
divided by number of
employees
Yearly State-
specific
USD BLS
Heating
Equipmentm,s
Share of households
using electric heating
’01,’05 Census
regions
Percent RECS
MainHeatingm,s Share of households
with electricity as
main heating fuel
’01,’05 Census
regions
Percent RECS
Ovenm,s Avg. number of
electric ovens per
household
’01,’05 Census
regions
Total RECS
Priceresm,s Avg. electric price for
residential customers
Monthly State-
specific
Cents/
kWh
EIA
Re f ri geratorsm,s Avg. number of
refrigerators per
household
’01,’05 Census
regions
Total RECS
Roomsm,s Avg. number of
rooms per household
’01,’05 Census
regions
Total RECS
Unemplo ymentm,s Unemployment level Yearly State-
specific
Relative
level
RECS
Wagem,s Avg. weekly wage Monthly State-
specific
USD BLS
Kidsm,s Avg. number of
children
Monthly State-
specific
Total RECS
Notes to Table 5.1: Census regions include 9 regions and 4 states (CA, NY, FL, TX) if not otherwise stated. The
exact references are: NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2016), RECS (Energy Information
Administration, 2016a), EIA (Energy Information Administration, 2016b), BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016),
NREL (National Renewables Energy Laboratory, 2016).
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5.5 Empirical Application
I use a two-stage empirical approach to assess the impact of electricity conservation
during the Energy Crisis based on the identified electricity reduction. First, I derive a
synthetic control group reproducing Californian residential electricity consumption
characteristics. As a result this control group resembles the Californian residential
electricity consumption pattern, however the control group will not be exposed to
events that happened in California during the post crisis years 2001 and 2002. Fur-
thermore, I display the development of residential electricity consumption in the
treatment state (California) and the control group state ‘Synthetic Energy Crisis Cal-
ifornia’ (SECC) on monthly basis. To link residential electricity reduction to its in-
fluencing factors, I then conduct a two stage least-squared treatment regression in a
second step. The regression aims at analyzing the significance of state-level residen-
tial electricity conservation programs, i.e. the mass media campaign for electricity
conservation and the ‘20/20’ rebate program, and their mutual impact on residential
electricity consumption.
5.5.1 Synthetic control group derivation and results
Residential electricity consumption varies substantially on a federal and regional
level. Most of the difference are due to states’ demographic structures with re-
spect to age or family structure, climatic conditions, economic aspects as well as
housing and social characteristics. Such a rich set of explanatory variables for resi-
dential electricity consumption imposes strong requirements on a potential control
group state reflecting Californian characteristics before the Energy Crisis in Califor-
nia. Thus, a single state may not be able to capture Californian residential electricity
consumption appropriately. As a consequence, I apply a synthetic control method
for the Energy Crisis in order to resemble the residential electricity consumption in
California before the Energy Crisis. As a result, the SECC resembles the Californian
residential consumption pattern prior to the events of the Energy Crisis by using a
weighted combination of all U.S. states. The derivation of the control group with
synthetic control methods is mainly based on Abadie & Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie
et al. (2010) and Abadie et al. (2015), however applications on energy-economic
related topics remain rare except for Paschmann & Paulus (2017).
The individual weights (w) for the synthetic control group state are determined
by minimizing the difference between Californian characteristics (Y1) and the re-
spective characteristics in the resulting control group (Y0 ·w). Equation 5.1 provides
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the formal description for minimizing this difference with the following objective
function
min
w
(Y1 − Y0 ·w)′V (Y1 − Y0 ·w). (5.1)
Nonnegative synthetic control weights (w) reflect states with similar consumption
characteristics of the treatment state. State weights w sum up to one and the all data
described under Section 5.4 are used for the derivation of the synthetic control group
state.62 To account for the relative importance of the individual explanatory vari-
ables Y of each state, a vector V containing nonnegative components is determined
with a standard regression technique, as described by Abadie & Gardeazabal (2003)
or Abadie et al. (2010). Based on the regression, the V vector is chosen such that
residential electricity consumption per household for California before the tipping
point of the Energy Crisis is best reproduced by the synthetic control. The weight
vector V is computed by using all periods prior to the events of the Energy Crisis,
since V may vary before and after these events due to different underlying causal
relations between the residential consumption and its explanatory variables.63
Before measuring and commenting on the impact of the two nationwide imple-
mented conservation programs on Californian residential electricity during the En-
ergy Crisis, I identify a suitable point in time allowing me to distinguish between the
actual Californian residential electricity development and a synthetic one display-
ing a counter factual consumption development. Furthermore, this point in time,
motivated by the Energy Crisis outages, enables me to relate back all consumption
impacts in the following periods to this point in time. I identify the 16 gigawatts
capacity revisions of November 2000 as triggering event for the synthetic controls
state since the November events constituted the peak of all destabilizing effects in
the electricity market up to that point. It therefore supports the argument that sup-
ply shortages destabilized the electricity market to a point of ‘no return’. As such, the
chosen point in time additionally coincides with an official statement from the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) which in November 2000 announced
that the Californian Energy System is ‘flawed’ (Wolak, 2003).
As states for the control group should display similar residential consumption pat-
62Temporal resolution of the data is to some extend neglected within the synthetic control method,
since the method is based on average values of the explanatory variables over all pre-treatment
periods, regardless of the selected pre-treatment period.
63Details on weights are listed in Table 5.4 of the Appendix.
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terns prior to events of the Energy Crisis, consumption patterns across all states are
thoroughly analyzed before the use of the synthetic control. Clearly, the hetero-
geneity of consumption patterns across all U.S. states is large, showing states with
consumption patterns differing in levels and monthly cycles. Thus, the set of suitable
states for the synthetic control is naturally restricted since some states exhibit similar
residential electricity consumption patterns and increases over the summer periods
in 2000. Comparing year-over-year residential consumption increases in California
with others states indicates that states with similar patterns and demand increases,
i.e. between 5% to 10%, are Colorado, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Texas and Utah.64
Not surprisingly, the synthetic control state ‘Synthetic Energy Crisis California’
(SECC) combines a subset of the above states. As a result, the synthetic control
group states are Texas, Colorado and New Mexico, where Texas has a weight of 4%,
Colorado has a weight of 13% and the weight of New Mexico amounts to 83%. A
first comparison based on meteorological data such as average, maximum and min-
imum temperature, HDDs and CDDs reveals that New Mexico and Colorado have
similar climate conditions and Texas resembles some of California’s economic indi-
cators such as average weekly wages or relative real income for the analyzed period.
Robustness checks supporting the use of a synthetic control have been performed,
in particular with respect to pre-period time selection and parallel trends. Vary-
ing the data base prior to the Energy Crisis leaves post treatment synthetic control
state patterns as shown in Figure 5.2. Variations with respect to consumption pat-
terns are below 1%. Additionally, a test to verify the parallel trends assumption for
residential electricity consumption has been carried out. By splitting the entire pre-
treatment period into sub-periods, the test shows that the assumption of parallel
trends is valid.65
Figure 5.2 shows that prior to the treatment, the residential electricity consump-
tion pattern of ‘Synthetic Energy Crisis California’ resembles the actual Californian
pattern. This is especially true when comparing both seasonality patterns and con-
sumption levels. Californian residential consumption exhibits upwards and down-
wards movements in a range between 460 kWh/month and 705 kWh/month. Sim-
ilar seasonal patterns in levels are found for ‘Synthetic Energy Crisis California’ with
residential electricity consumption per household ranging between 480 kWh/month
64Residential electricity consumption for those states over the 48-month period are depicted in Fig-
ure 5.6 of the Appendix.
65A detailed description on the test is provided in Section 5.7.6.
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Figure 5.2: Descriptive Comparison for the ’Synthetic Control Group’-State (SECC) and Cal-
ifornia
and 705 kWh/month. On average, residential electricity consumption of ‘Synthetic
Energy Crisis California’ is 4 kWh/month lower than the pattern for California over
the pre-treatment months. Thus, the synthetically derived SECC state reflects an
accurate however not perfect match.
Periods after the treatment continue to show fluctuating patterns of positive and
negative differences. However, after the year 2000 larger differences are observable
in Figure 5.2. The residential consumption pattern for California shows an excess
of negative differences (see Figure 5.5 of the Appendix) of on average -65kWhs.
Taken together, the comparison is indicative of the negative influences on residential
electricity consumption in the post treatment years 2001 and 2002. Nevertheless,
the statistically negative excess of electricity has yet to be analyzed and put into
perspective considering the conservation programs taken during the post treatment
years 2001 and 2002.
5.5.2 Two-stage least-squared treatment regression and results
To quantify residential reduction stemming from the conservation programs, I con-
duct a two-stage least-squared treatment regression. By empirical design, the im-
pact of the conservation impact is jointly analyzed using data for California and for
99
5 Electricity Reduction in the Residential Sector
SECC. The effect of the conservation is jointly analyzed since both, the media cam-
paign and the ‘20/20’ rebate program, occurred over the same time and mutually
targeted a behavioral consumption change rather than the replacement of technical,
more efficient, household equipment. The treatment term in the regression captures
the electricity conservation within the Californian residential sector by interacting
the observations of California and quarterly time periods within the Energy Crisis
years 2001 and 2002. By applying a two-stage least-squared treatment regression, I
am furthermore able to address endogeneity issues within electricity markets where
electricity prices and residential electricity consumption are mutually dependent, es-
pecially if time horizons coincide. Although I expect the electricity price data used to
be largely independent from the consumption since the electricity price I compute
is averaged across IOUs and over the month thereby not clearly linking regional
residential prices and consumption, endogeneity may not be completely ruled out.
Another reason for that is that reverse causality may also stem from the ‘20/20’ re-
bate program itself since the program intended to achieve lower consumption levels
based on the respective residential price in that month. Lutzenhiser (1993) and
Hass et al. (1975), for instance, argue that consumer’s consciousness with respect to
consumption and prices is more sensible in stressed situations increasing the likeli-
hood to react to the conservation programs. I thus apply a two-stage least-squared
treatment regression in order to first ‘disconnect’ the consumption in month m from
the residential electricity price in the same month and secondly from indirect price
sensitivity originating from the ‘20/20’ rebate program. The Equation 5.2 shows the
first stage of the regression with residential electricity price lags
ln press,m = intercept1 + γ
′ ln press,m−1 + εs,m, (5.2)
where ln press,m is the logarithmic residential electricity price of the state s in month
m and ln press,m−1 is the logarithmic electricity price from the previous month. Further-
more, the standard instrument variable requirement, such as cov[press,m, p
res
s,m−1] 6= 0
has been verified, confirming the overall high autocorrelation (>0.8) among resi-
dential prices.66
The Equation 5.3 displays the second stage that accounts for other explanatory
variables besides the instrumented residential electricity price. This log-linear esti-
66Testing for validity, expressed by cov[demand ress,m,µ] = 0, is not feasible since the model is exactly
identified. However, supporting qualitative evidence for supply shocks other than those discussed
impacting the error term after the treatment is not present.
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mation equation
ln demand ress,m = intercept2 +α
′Dummym +δ′ t reatmentqr t y,y
+ β ′1Y 1s,m + β ′2 ln Y 2s,m +µs,m
(5.3)
allows me to comment on relative effect and captures both, linear and logarithmic
explanatory variables, expressed by Y 1s,m and ln Y 2s,m. For linear explanatory vari-
ables, I choose weather conditions that are by definition exogenous. More precisely,
I use heating and cooling degree days (HDD, CDDs) in order to infer on weather
influences altering residential electricity consumption. For logarithmic explanatory
variables, average weekly wage and the estimated residential electricity price from
Equation 5.2 is used. Other influences on consumption arise from physical housing
characteristics, however those are highly correlated to wage providing a good proxy
for physical housing characteristics.67 On the left hand side of the Equation 5.3, the
logarithmic dependent variable ln demand ress,m reflecting the residential state-specific
consumption is displayed. The treatment coefficient δ′ will provide insights into the
residential electricity reduction during the Californian Energy Crisis years 2001 and
2002 on a quarterly basis. Since I account for a general time trend with respect to
residential electricity consumption by using monthly dummies (Dummym) over the
48-months period, the treatment term covers quarterly time horizons for each year
in order to filter all other effects not related to monthly time trends.68
The estimation results reveal some interesting insights that are summarized in
Table 5.2. First, I find that the cooling or heating degree days positively impact the
residential electricity consumption through either the usage of air conditioning or
electric heating within the residential sector. The magnitudes of the coefficients for
CDDs and HDDs are low and significant at the 1% level contributing thus to the
explanatory power of the overall regression model.69 Furthermore, weekly wages
reflect the purchasing power per state on a monthly basis. Those wages can partially
be spent for electrical household equipment or more generally reflect the consumer’s
attitude towards residential electricity consumption by accounting for their income.
67Other explanatory variables such as family size or consumers’ education have been analyzed and
neglected for the estimation due to overall little variation within the data over the analyzed short
time period.
68Variation for the estimation with respect to treatment time selection have been tested. Monthly
treatment terms can be neglected, since high correlations between the monthly dummies and the
treatment occur leading to estimation bias. The highest temporal resolution is thus obtained by
quarterly treatment terms.
69R-squared is 90%.
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As a monetary variable, wage is also closely linked to macro-economic indicators
such as the gross domestic product (GDP) that similarly influences the electricity
consumption pattern over the year. Additionally, wage is likely to relate to housing
characteristics, such as housing size or even family size (i.e. number of children
per household). As such the impact of wage on residential electricity consumption
accounts for multiple factors. In the estimation, the coefficient for weekly wage is
significant and shows a high positive influence on residential consumption.
Contrary to that, the estimation results reveal that the residential electricity price
does not statistically impact the residential electricity consumption. This seems plau-
sible since Californian residential electricity prices lacked instantaneous adjustment
to wholesale price movements and, more importantly, residential consumers were
not on real time pricing schemes during the Energy Crisis and rather signed contracts
with their utilities for two-tiered tariffs over longer time periods.
I observe a significant impact of quarterly treatment terms whereas the impact
of the treatment term differs with respect to the quarters of the years 2001 and
2002, as shown in Table 5.2. The respective electricity reduction in the first quarter
is 9.1% which amounts to a reduction in levels of on average 50 kWhs per month
and household.70 The reduction effect coincides from a temporal perspective with
the launch and thus the fierce promotion of electricity conservation within the mass
media campaign in January 2001. In the second quarter of 2001 my results are
indicative of a 11.0% reduction (52 kWhs) whereas from a timely perspective the
potential conservation effects arising from the media campaign and the ‘20/20’ re-
bate program overlap solely in June 2001. The treatment term for the 3rd quarter,
t reatmentQ3,2001, fully covers the ’20/20’ rebate program and the impact of the me-
dia campaign showing a maximum reduction of 12.1% reduction (68 kWhs). The
first, second and third quarterly treatment effects within 2001 are furthermore sig-
nificant at the 1% level. During the fourth quarter in 2001, no significant electricity
reduction occurs which I relate to consumers’ comfort issue preferring warm housing
environments during winter. As radio, newspaper and television spots for electricity
conservation continued, however with lower frequency, my estimation results reveal
further electricity reductions for the following year. The quarterly treatment coef-
ficients are however overall lower in terms of magnitude and decrease over time
compared to 2001. The reduction in 2002 is 9.0% (down by 0.1%) in the first quar-
ter, 6.4% (down by 4.6%) in the second quarter and 8.1% (down by 4.0%) in the
third quarter. Thus, policy makers may achieve a reduction of electricity consump-
70The treatment coefficient δ is transformed by using [exp(δ)-1].
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tion in on and off-peak months by implementing conservation programs whereas the
impact of conservation programs is more strong in summer months.
Table 5.2: Determinants of monthly residential electricity consumption: IV estimation re-
sults
Dependent variable: lndemand resm,s
Explanatory variable Coefficient Std. error
C DDm,s 0.0008
∗∗∗ (0.000)
HDDm,s 0.0002
∗∗∗ (0.000)
lnWagem,s 0.2172
∗∗∗ (0.070)
lnPriceresm,s -0.1199 (0.103)
t reatmentQ1,2001 -0.0956
∗∗∗ (0.025)
t reatmentQ2,2001 -0.1169
∗∗∗ (0.027)
t reatmentQ3,2001 -0.1290
∗∗∗ (0.035)
t reatmentQ4,2001 -0.0128 (0.023)
t reatmentQ1,2002 -0.0938
∗∗∗ (0.038)
t reatmentQ2,2002 -0.0666
∗∗ (0.031)
t reatmentQ3,2002 -0.0845
∗∗∗ (0.034)
t reatmentQ4,2002 -0.0446 (0.033)
intercept2 -2.226
∗∗∗ (0.683)
monthly controls yes
observations 96
R2 0.897
F 59,73
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Instruments for 2SLS: Price lag (m-1)
variable.∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗: significant at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-level.
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5.6 Conclusion
As a consequence of electricity outages that occurred in California in 2000, the State
of California decided to curb electricity consumption with the help of two state-
promoted conservation programs in the Energy Crisis targeting the years 2001 and
2002. With a potential residential consumption reduction, policy makers were hop-
ing to contain the Energy Crisis and its electricity blackouts. Although the mass
media campaign and the ‘20/20’ rebate program faced some initial critique, the
Californian Government implemented both on a national level targeting behavioral
changes for electricity usage in order to reduce residential electricity consumption.
The article at hand empirically analyzes the effectiveness of the two conserva-
tion programs jointly by conducting an empirical analysis in two consecutive steps.
First, I make use of constructing a synthetic control group, called ‘Synthetic Energy
Crisis California’ (SECC), not exposed to governmental conservation programs that
resulted from the Energy Crisis. The resulting synthetic control group state leads me
to the structural comparison of a treated and untreated state, whereas I interpret the
resulting difference between the consumption patterns as reduction potential, that
without the crisis would not have been revealed and has so far not been quantified.
In a second empirical step, I conduct a two stage least-squared treatment regression
assessing the effectiveness of the implemented conservation programs. By control-
ling for weather, electricity prices and economic indicators, I specifically filter out
the conservation effect for all four quarters of the years 2001 and 2002.
As expected, I find that heating or cooling increase residential consumption as
well as the purchasing power of households, expressed by the significant positive
coefficient of the wage indicator. I relate the positive impact of wages on residential
consumption to the fact that wage is a good proxy for purchasing power interacting
with a variety of influences on residential electricity consumption, such as housing
and family size or conservation attitude itself. I furthermore find that residential
consumption reductions temporally overlap with the conservation efforts in a con-
sistent manner. Electricity reductions occur more strongly in 2001 compared to 2002
ranging between 6% and 12% depending on the analyzed quarter. Since the mass
media ran with lower frequency in 2002 and was put into a broader energy saving
context, this downward trend seems to be plausible. My result furthermore show
that an envisaged residential electricity reduction of 20% has never been achieved
neither by the ‘20/20’ rebate program or by the rebate program itself nor jointly by
the rebate program and the mass media conservation campaign. Reasons for that
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are that not all customers, if at all, reacted likewise to the conservation incentives.
Furthermore, I argue that an electricity consumption change driven by a structural
replacement of household equipment was not present during the Energy Crisis and
in particular not in the years 2001 and 2002. Firstly because no fierce policy in-
centivized residential consumers to replace equipment in the short time span and
secondly attention was channeled towards conservation through altering electric-
ity use. Thus, some residential consumers were rather able to change consumption
habits in order to reduce electricity usage.
Nevertheless the estimation results need to interpreted with care, since I do not
specifically control for the mass media campaign and the ‘20/20’ rebate program.
This is primarily driven by not finding suitable control variable data for the mass
media campaign and the ‘20/20’ rebate program that would explicitly account for
the impact on residential electricity consumption. Additionally, some residential
electricity reduction may also stem from other factors; an example for that could be
a residential electricity consumer who made efforts to reduce electricity consumption
during the Energy Crisis however was neither influenced by the media campaign nor
participated in the rebate program due to not reaching the threshold of 20%.
Also, reductions in electricity consumption that resulted from the Energy Crisis
cannot be generalized to other states in the U.S. or different countries. An argument
to bring forward is that households and consumer (behavior) differ when analyzing
other regions. Besides differences due to macro economic and geographically as-
pects on a country level, further differences stem from socio-economic and physical
characteristics of households, as well as to the preference ordering of the individual
household members when it comes to comfort issues. Nevertheless an analysis on
obtrusive policy events can be carried out separately for other countries and sectors
by thoroughly applying synthetic control techniques in order to address impacts on
consumption in larger frameworks with lacking control groups.
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5.7.1 Exemplary residential sample bill from Southern California
Edison (SCE)
Figure 5.3: Sample bill including ’20/20’ rebate for residential customers. [Source: South-
ern California Edison, 2017]
5.7.2 Total capacity revisions by the major three IOUs in 1999 and
2000
Figure 5.4: Un- or scheduled capacity revisions by IOUs in MW. [Source: Blumstein et al.,
2002]
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5.7.3 Descriptives for synthetic control and regression data
Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean SD Min 25% Median 75% Max
C DDm,s 490 111 163 0 0 16 177 651
Clothesdr yerm,s 490 0.8 0.117 0.472 0.758 0.806 0.869 0.94
Demand res,ad jm,s 490 0.857 0.318 0.432 0.615 0.77 1.012 1.947
F loorspacem,s 490 1980 236 1568 1757 1977 2277 2289
GDPm,s 490 0.003 0 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004
HDDm,s 490 390 377 0 30 296 663 1504
HeatingEquipmentm,s 490 0.259 0.109 0.108 0.177 0.237 0.65 0.475
MainHeatingm,s 490 0.186 0.149 0.031 0.111 0 .179 0.247 0.5
Ovenm,s 490 1.066 0.011 1.043 1.058 1.064 1.076 1.081
Priceresm,s 490 0.078 0.018 0.052 0.066 0.074 0.086 0.147
Re f ri geratorsm,s 490 1.205 0.0458 1.139 1.179 1.2 1.233 1.295
Roomsm,s 490 5.728 0.233 5.134 5.597 5.809 6.948 6.014
Unemplo ymentm,s 490 4.404 1.085 2.7 3.4 4.4 5.3 6.8
Wagem,s 490 614 86 475 549 593 669 837
Kidsm,s 490 0.694 0.044 0.648 0.648 0.696 0.738 0.738
5.7.4 Synthetic weight vector V for the exogenous variables
Table 5.4: Weights of the exogenous variables
Label Weight
C DDm,s 0.041
Clothesdr yerm,s 0.012
F loorspacem,s 0.181
GDPm,s 0.041
HDDm,s 0.129
HeatingEquipmentm,s 0.135
MainHeatingm,s 0.017
Ovenm,s 0.023
Priceresm,s 0.121
Re f ri geratorsm,s 0.116
Roomsm,s 0.044
Unemplo ymentm,s 0.106
Wagem,s 0.029
Kidsm,s 0.002
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5.7.5 Difference Plot - Synthetic Control Group State ’SECC’ and
California
Figure 5.5: Synthetic Control Results - Difference Plot
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Development of residential electricity consumption in pre-selected
states
(i) Colorado
(ii) Missouri
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(iii) Nebraska
(iv) New Mexico
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(v) Oklahoma
(vi) Texas
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(vii) Utah
Figure 5.6: Residential consumption in pre-selected states over 48-month period
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5.7.6 Parallel trends test
Testing for parallel trends assures that the use of the consumption patterns for Cali-
fornia and the derived control group state is indeed following similar patterns before
the crisis, unbiased of any other consumption-reducing influences (i.e. other pro-
grams or events). Therefore, I make use of using a difference-in-difference estima-
tion based on data for the treated and untreated state. As explanatory variables, I use
HDD, CDD, unemployment level, wages, lagged residential electricity prices, pre-
treatment (pre_t r t), interim-treatment (int_t r t) and post-treatment (post_t r t)
time dummies. The respective time dummies reflect the months in 1999 (pre_t r t),
2000 (int_t r t) and 2001-2002 (post_t r t). Among others, estimates for the treat-
ment dummies are provided in Table 5.5. Two meaningful insights for the synthetic
control approach can be derived; first, I can neglect other consumption reducing
impacts shortly before the Energy Crisis due to the non-significant coefficient of the
interim-treatment time dummy (int_t r t). Thus, the parallel trends assumption is
valid. Second, the negative impact on residential electricity consumption of the
post_t r t time dummy (−0.158, significant at the 5% level) provides first evidence
for an aggregated reduction through conservation programs that are studied in more
depth in Section 5.5.2.
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Table 5.5: IV Estimates when controlling for pre- and post crisis treatment time dummies
Dependent variable: ∆Demand resm
Explanatory variable IV
pre_t r t -0.085
(0. 699)
int_t r t -0.108
(0.0934)
post_t r t -0.158∗∗
(0.0830)
∆Priceelec,resm -1.4904
(2.4594)
∆C DDm 0.0003
∗∗∗
(0.0001)
∆HDDm 0.0001
∗
(0.0001)
∆Unemplo ymentl vlm 0.0639
(0.0616)
∆Wagem 0.0006
(0.0004)
observations 48
R2 0.70
F 29.3
p-value 0.00
Notes to Table: Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ∗ / ∗∗ / ∗∗∗ : significant at the
0.1 / 0.05 / 0.01 error level respectively. Data
used covers a 48-month period from January
1999 until December 2002.
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